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ABSTRACT
The Japanese government is now reviewing the National Defense Program
Guideline in and after FY 2005 (NDPG 04), and this review will be completed by the end
of this year. Even though NDPG 04 provides Japan’s security and defense policy vision
to FY 2014, the government nevertheless has decided to change it completely. The
purpose of this thesis is to know the reason why the Japanese government has decided to
change NDPG 04 completely, the likely contents of NDPG 09, and NDPG 09’s effect on
the US-Japan alliance.
The globalizing international society and threats have been increasingly
diversified and multi-polarized since the end of the Cold War, and Japan cannot deal with
them alone. The fiscal crisis and scandals within the ministry of defense (MOD) and the
Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) have led to a renewed discussion of the security of
Japan and the US-Japan security arrangement, particularly given the present five-year
review of NDPG 04 now underway. The Japanese political environment on national
security changed dramatically during the Koizumi administration (2001-06), which
allowed for calm discussion of Japan’s security policy not just among Japan’s leaders, but
also among the general population.
More recently, governmental policymakers have recognized that it is impossible
for Japan to deal with these international and domestic security issues under NDPG 04
ii

and with the present security and defense system. Therefore they have decided to
strengthen Japan’s security system in the forthcoming NDPG 09 while still remaining
compliant with Article 9 of the Japan’s Constitution. Whichever party or party coalition
wins the next general election later this year, the new leadership likely will see Japan’s
cooperation not only with the United States, but also with other countries both bilaterally
and multilaterally in international organizations as essential to preventing diversified
threats from reaching Japan. In this regard, a Sun Tzu style preventive strategy appears
to be the best way to secure Japan and contribute to global security.
This thesis represents the views of its author, not those of the Japan Maritime
Self Defense Force to which its author belongs, or any other agency of the Japanese
government.
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The highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without fighting at all.
– Sun Tzu
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Introduction: Purpose of This Thesis
According to the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, the Japanese government
plans to review and revise the present National Defense Program Guidelines in and after
FY 2005 (NDPG 04) by the end of this year.1 The government is considering changing
them completely. 2 The purpose of this thesis is to investigate why the Japanese
government decided to change the NDPG completely, the likely contents of NDPG 09,
and NDPG 09’s likely effect on the US-Japan alliance. This thesis presents the hypothesis
that both the domestic political environment and the international security environment
have affected the Japanese government’s decision to completely change NDPG.
Regardless of which party or coalition wins the next general election, the date of which is
at present not yet set, but which will be held by this September, in addition to sustaining
the US-Japan Security Arrangement, it will be essential for Japan to cooperate bilaterally
and multilaterally in international organizations to prevent diverse threats from reaching
Japan. The Sun Tzu style crisis- prevention strategy is likely the best way to secure
Japan and the world.
President Barack Obama said on Feb 24, 2009 when he met Japanese Prime
Minister Taro Aso in the White House, "The alliance that we have is the cornerstone of
security in East Asia."3 In Asia, there is no effective regional security organization for the

1

Cabinet Secretariat of Japan, Cabinet Public Relations Office, “Announcement by the Chief
Cabinet Secretary about Council on Security and Defense Capabilities,” Cabinet Secretariat of Japan,
Cabinet Public Relations Office, January 8, 2009,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2009/01/08_a.html (accessed April 13, 2009).
2

The Asagumo Shinbunsha, “News,” The Asagumo Shinbun, January 15, 2009,
http://www.asagumo-news.com/news.html (accessed Feb 16, 2009).
3

Kent Klein, “Obama, Japanese PM Discuss Economy, Security,” VOANews.com, February 24,
2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-24-voa10.cfm (accessed March 5, 2009).

1

US like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Bilateral security arrangements
especially with Japan are important to protect the US interest and secure peace in this
region. Therefore the US must understand Japan’s willingness to change its defense
policy.
As of May 2009, the reviewing process of NDPG 04 is in progress. In this essay, I
attempt to deal with the latest topic, so I have had to utilize much on-line information. If
we wait until this December, we can know the final result of this review. I chose this
topic for my master’s thesis because I believe that knowing about the progress of the
process of making NDPG 09 is very beneficial for US scholars researching politics in
Japan.

2

Chapter 1: Characteristics of NDPG
In this chapter, I would like to show characteristics of NDPG 04 through
explaining Japan’s security/defense history after World War II, NDPG 04 itself, and the
legal basis of Japan’s security/defense policy. Even though the Japanese Constitution
prohibits Japan from possessing a military force, Japan now possesses the Self Defense
Force. In order to understand such a complex reality, we have to know its history affected
by the US. We also need to understand the function of NDPG to compare it with US
security/defense strategy documents. And we cannot understand NDPG’s contents
without knowing the unique legal basis of Japanese security/defense policy in detail.
History of Japan’s Security/Defense and Relationship with the US
Constitution of Japan
In the end of the Second World War, on August 14, 1945, the Japanese
government decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration in order to save its state from
destruction.4 On September 2, Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers, and Japanese
governmental authority was made subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP).5 On October 11, the SCAP, US General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, ordered Prime Minister Sidehara to make a democratic constitution in

4

National Diet Library, "Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War," National Diet Library,
August 14, 1945, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/017/017tx.html (accessed March 19, 2009).
5

National Archives and Records Administration, "Instrument of Surrender." National Archives
and Records Administration, September 2, 1945,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/japanese_surrender_document/ (accessed March 19,
2009); and National Diet Library, "Imperial Rescript on signing of the Instrument of Surrender," National
Diet Library, Sptember 2, 1945, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/021/021tx.html#t001
(accessed March 19, 2009).
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accordance with the Potsdam Declaration.6 The Japanese people also wanted to make a
democratic and peaceful constitution at the time, so the new constitution was made and
promulgated quickly on November 3, 1946 under the strong influence of the SCAP. The
Constitution of Japan stipulates renunciation of war as an exercise of its sovereign right.
Article 9.Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.7
In Article 9, Section 2, the Constitution also limits the government’s possession of
military power. Since its promulgation, the Japanese people have not yet changed their
constitution for 63 years.
Establishment of the National Police Reserve
On June 25, 1950, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) started the
Korean War. At the time, most of the Allied Powers in Japan consisted of the US Armed
Forces and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 84, adopted on July 7, 1950, recommended member states
militarily support the Republic of Korea.8 Therefore the Allied Powers in Japan moved to
the Korean Peninsula as the United Nations Command to battle against the DPRK troops.
6

National Diet Library, "Meeting on October 11 between MacArthur and Shidehara," National
Diet Library, October 11, 1945, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/01/033/033tx.html (accessed
March 19, 2009); and National Diet Library, "Potsdam Declaration," National Diet Library, July 26, 1945,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (accessed March 19, 2009).
7

National Diet Library, "The Constitution of Japan," National Diet Library, November 3, 1946,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (accessed March 19, 2009).
8

United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Resolutions – 1950," United Nations
Security Council, July 7, 1950,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/97/IMG/NR006497.pdf?OpenElement
(accessed March 19, 2009).
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The SCAP and the US government decided on a Reverse Course, namely, that Japan
should rearm to protect itself from the threat of communist states in spite of the Potsdam
Declaration.9 On July 8, 1950, MacArthur ordered Prime Minister Yoshida to establish
the National Police Reserve (NPR) composed of 75,000 men, and to strengthen the
Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) of the Ministry of Transport in order to maintain public
order without the Allied Powers being stationed in Japan.10 By the Cabinet Order
concerning the NPR given on August 10, 1950, and its related suborders, the NPR was
organized militarily. It belonged directly to the Cabinet Office. By October 1951, the
NPR was equipped with carbines, machine guns, infantry mortars and rocket launchers.11
According to Kuzuhara, the SCAP regarded the NPR as a defense force.12 On April 26,
1952, the Coastal Safety Force (CSF), composed of about 6,000 sailors, was established
within the MSA. This was a maritime emergency readiness force similar to the NPR. The
government explained that the NPR and the CSF were just police reserves intended to
maintain public order and not military forces.

9

Thomas A. Drohan, American-Japanese Security Agreements, Past and Present (Jefferson,
North Carolina : McFarland & Company, 2007), 54.
10

National Diet Library, "Douglas MacArthur's Letter to Prime Minister," National Diet Library,
July 8, 1950, http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/img_r/M010/M010-001r.html (accessed March 19, 2009).
11

Hosei University, Ohara Institute for Social Research, "The Labour Year Book of Japan 1953."
Hosei University, Ohara Institute for Social Research, November 15, 1952,
http://oohara.mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp/rn/25/rn1953-652.html (accessed March 19, 2009).
12

Kazumi Kuzuhara, "The Korean War and Japan’s National Police Reserve." National Institute
for Defense Studies Bulletin 8, no. 3 (March 2006): 23.
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The Treaty of San Francisco and Rearmament: not Military Force but Self Defense Force
Japan and 49 allied states signed the Treaty of Peace with Japan on September 8,
1951 in San Francisco.13 As a result, on April 28, 1952, Japan regained its sovereignty.
At the same time, Japan and the US agreed to a Security Treaty between Japan and the
United States of America.
According to this treaty, the US expressed its hope in the preamble as follows:
The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently
willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the
expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for
its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any
armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace
and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter. 14
Both the Japanese and the US governments agreed that Japan would rearm
suitably to protect itself from direct and indirect aggression in the Cold War era. On July
31, 1952, the Japanese government promulgated the National Safety Agency (NSA) Act,
the NSA was established and the NPR was changed into the National Safety Force (NSF).
The CSF moved from the MSA to the NSA. According to the NSA Act, the NSF and the
CSF were no longer police reserves but units equipped with tanks and combatant ships.
The NSF consisted of 110,000 men, and the CSF consisted of 7,590 sailors. The NSA
was an external organ of the Cabinet Office. According to Minister of State Ohashi, the

13

UCLA Center for East Asian Studies, "The Treaty of Peace with Japan." UCLA Center for East
Asian Studies, September 8, 1951, http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/peace1951.htm
(accessed March 19, 2009).
14

"Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America," September 8, 1951, United
States Treaties and Other International Agreements 3, pt. 1.
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NSA, the NSF and the CSF were organized to maintain peace and public order, and to
make operations more efficient.15
On March 8, 1954, U.S. and Japan concluded the Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement. In Article 8, both governments agreed that Japan would attempt to develop
its defense capacities.
The Government of Japan, reaffirming its determination to join in promoting
international understanding and good will, and maintaining world peace, to take
such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international
tension, and to fulfill the military obligations which the Government of Japan has
assumed under the Security Treaty between the United States of America and
Japan, will make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the
full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general
economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive
strength and the defensive strength of the free world, take all reasonable measures
which may be needed to develop its defense capacities, and take appropriate steps
to ensure the effective utilization of any assistance provided by the Government
of the United States of America. 16
And Japan decided to build its defense force. On July 1, 1954, the Self Defense
Forces (SDF) Act was enforced and the NSA was changed into the Japan Defense
Agency (JDA) of the Cabinet Office.17 The NSF and the CSF were changed into the
Ground SDF (GSDF) and the Maritime SDF (MSDF), and the Air SDF (ASDF) was
established. At that time, the GSDF consisted of 139,000 men, the MSDF consisted of
16,000 sailors and 58,000 tonnages of ships, and the ASDF consisted of 6,700 men and

15

Hosei University, Ohara Institute for Social Research, "The Labour Year Book of Japan 1954."
Hosei University, Ohara Institute for Social Research, November 20, 1953,
http://oohara.mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp/rn/26/rn1954-758.html (accessed March 19, 2009).
16

"Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America,"
March 8, 1954, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 5, pt. 1.
17

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, "Self Defense Forces Act," Electrical Acts
Data System, June 9, 1954. http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO165.html (accessed March 20,
2009).
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150 airplanes.18 The purpose of the JSDF is to defend Japan from direct and indirect
invasion, to maintain the peace, independence and security of Japan, and to maintain
public order if necessary.
Defense Build-up Plans from 1957 to 1976 and related issues
At the San Francisco conference in 1952, the Soviet Union representatives
attended, but did not sign the San Francisco treaty, because they opposed China’s
absence. Japan tried to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and finally, on
October 19, 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union agreed on the Joint Declaration between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. As a result, Japan was able to become
a member of the United Nations on December 18, 1956 without obstacles. However
international tensions between the East and the West in East Asia became serious because
of the First Indochina War and nuclear testing.
On July 2, 1956, the government established the National Defense Council to
discuss defense matters politically.19 In the beginning, all the JSDF equipment consisted
of weapons the US provided. After the establishment of the JDA, the Government of
Japan attempted to develop defense industries and equip the JSDF with domestically
produced weapons. Japan needed to make a plan to develop its defense capability. On
May 20, 1957, the Basic Guidelines for National Defense were approved by the National
Defense Council and the Cabinet. This, as I will mention later, was a principle of Japan’s
defense policy. Based on the Guidelines, from 1957 to 1976, the Japanese government
18

Yuzuru Tamura, “History of the JSDF and the new NDPG,” Matsuyama University, Law
Department, Dr. Tamura’s Office, http://www.cc.matsuyamau.ac.jp/~tamura/jieitainoennkakutosinnboutaikou.htm (accessed March 20, 2009).
19

Nakano Library. "Act on composition of the National Defense Council," Acts, July 2, 1956,
http://www.geocities.jp/nakanolib/hou/hs31-166.htm (accessed March 20, 2009).
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made four Defense Build-up Plans to indicate the purposes of the Japanese midterm
defense policy and the goals of the JSDF units every three or five years.
The First Defense Build-up Plan was issued on June 14, 1957. According to the
First Defense Build-up Plan, the JDA tried to strengthen the GSDF troops to 180,000
men, the MSDF ships and airplanes to 124,000 tonnages and about 200 airplanes, the
ASDF airplanes to 1300.20 This three years plan was in effect from Fiscal Year (FY)
1958 to FY 1960.21 This plan was to build the minimum defense force necessary for
Japan to defend itself.
On January 19, 1960, Japan and the US signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security between the United States and Japan to revise the former alliance treaty of
1952, because the former one was unilateral. When both governments signed the treaty of
1952, Japan did not possess its own defense force. Therefore the US had the unilateral
responsibility to protect Japan, and Japan provided bases for the US Armed Forces in
Japan. Japan and the US agreed that the US Armed Forces and the JSDF should mutually
protect Japanese territory and US bases in Japan.
ARTICLE V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in
the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed
attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of
Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.22
20

National Diet Library, "First Defense Build-up Plan," National Diet Library, June 14, 1957,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/horei_jp/kakugi/txt/txt01273.htm (accessed March 20, 2009).
21

In Japan, FY starts on April 1, and ends on next year’s March 31.

22

"Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America,"
January 19, 1960, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 11, pt. 2.
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On July 18, 1961, the Japanese government approved the Second Defense Buildup Plan. Because of the new alliance treaty, this plan was made to establish the minimum
defense capability for dealing with conventional limited warfare. According to this five
year plan, the GSDF troops was to be 180,000, the MSDF was to be 140,000 tonnages of
ships, and the ASDF was to be 1,000 planes plus 4 anti-air missile artillery units by the
end of FY 1966.23
On November 29, 1966, the Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan was adopted
by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet. In addition, on March 13, 1967, key
matters for inclusion in the Third Defense Build-up Plan were agreed upon. According to
these, the GSDF was to maintain its quota as 180,000, and the JSDF was to improve its
equipment.24 This plan was in effect from FY 1967 to FY 1971. The purpose of this plan
was almost the same as the former one. By the time this plan ended, the JSDF’s basis was
established.
The Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan was approved on February 7,
1972. On October 9, 1972, key matters for inclusion in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan
were approved, among which was equipping the JSDF with 160 tanks, 54 ships and 46 F4EJs25 At the same time, the National Defense Council and the Cabinet showed clearly

23

National Diet Library, "Second Defense Build-up Plan," National Diet Library, July 18, 1961,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/horei_jp/kakugi/txt/txt01369.htm (accessed March 20, 2009).
24

University of Tokyo, Institute of Oriental Culture, "Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan,"
University of Tokyo, Institute of Oriental Culture, November 29, 1966, http://www.ioc.utokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19661129.O1J.html (accessed March 20, 2009).
25

Japan Defense Agency, "Fourth Defense Build-up Plan," Defense of Japan 1976, 1976,
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1976/w1976_9106.html (accessed March 20, 2009).
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that Japan’s defense capability was intended to effectively prevent invasion. Japan had to
depend on US nuclear deterrence capability against threats of nuclear attack, and Japan
would have attempted to repulse an enemy’s indirect or small invasion by itself, or to
repulse a larger invasion in collaboration with the US Armed Forces under the US-Japan
security arrangement.26
National Defense Program Outline and Related Issues
By FY 1976, four Defense Build-up Plans had contributed to the building up of
Japan’s basic defense capability. After it was built up, the Japanese government decided
to make not a new Defense Build-up Plan but rather a National Defense Program Outline
(NDPO 76) to show people the posture of national defense considering domestic
budgetary and personnel limitations and the international situation.27 In addition, in the
NDPO 76, Japan developed the Basic Defense Force Concept to improve its defense
capability for the future.
The concept is designed to enable Japan to maintain the minimum necessary basic
defense capability as an independent state so as not to turn into a power vacuum
and become a destabilizing factor in the region, rather than preparing to directly
counter military threats.28
The government attached a table to show the ideal posture and strength of the
JSDF as the goal of the NDPO 76. The NDPO 76 stipulated that the GSDF should have
180,000 men, the MSDF should have 60 destroyers, and the ASDF should have 400
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operational airplanes.29 On the same day as its approval, the Miki administration decided
that the government would try to program and execute the defense budget within 1% of
the GNP every year.30 Japan’s defense policy was led by this new ideology.
On November 27, 1978, Japan and the US agreed on the Guidelines for U.S.Japan Defense Cooperation.31 With this agreement, both states tried to develop a mutual
defense plan for Japan based on Article 5, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between the United States and Japan. However they could not come to an agreement on
dealing with situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Japanese government has tried to
develop its defense force to deal with a limited conventional invasion by itself and to
collaborate with the US Armed Forces for a large scale invasion against Japan since this
agreement.
From FY 1977 to 1979, the JDA improved the JSDF through single-year plans
within the NDPO 76. However a multiple-FY plan was more convenient for the JDA,
because defense equipment was so expensive that the government could not buy it all at
once. Therefore, in July 1979, the JDA made an internal Mid-Term Defense Estimate for
FY 1980 – FY 1982 within the NDPO 76. The Second Mid-Term Defense Estimate was
announced on July 23, 1982, for FY 1983 to FY 1987. These Mid-Term Defense
Estimates were made not by the National Defense Council and the whole Cabinet as a

29

Japan Defense Agency, "National Defense Program Outline."

30

Ibid.

31

University of Tokyo, Institute of Oriental Culture, "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation," University of Tokyo, Institute of Oriental Culture, November 27, 1978, http://www.ioc.utokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19781127.O1J.html (accessed March 20, 2009).
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political decision but by the JDA as a bureaucratic decision as the government wanted to
share the responsibility for making a defense plan with policymakers.
On September 18, 1985, the National Defense Council and the Cabinet approved
the Mid-Term Defense Program to achieve the defense capability stipulated by the NDPO
76.
On July 1, 1986, the Nakasone administration made a change in the Security
Council Establishment Law and established the Security Council. On December 30, 1986,
the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced that the defense budget would exceed 1% of the
GNP in FY 1987. Still, the government respected the defense budget rule of staying
within 1% of the GNP.32
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In accordance with UNSCR 678, on
January 17, 1991, allied forces mainly led by the US started to free Kuwait from Iraq’s
invasion. The allied forces’ Operation Desert Storm successfully freed Kuwait and Iraq
and on April 11, in accordance with UNSCR 687, the allied forces ceased fire. Because
of its Constitution, Japan could not militarily support Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm.
However the Japanese government tried to support it not only fiscally but also politically.
Therefore, on April 26, 1991 it ordered the MSDF to send a minesweeper to the Persian
Gulf to minesweep. This operation, called Operation Dawn of the Gulf, was the first
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experience of JSDF troops deploying to a foreign state in an actual mission and it was
successfully completed.33
On December 20, 1990, the government approved the Mid-Term Defense
Program for from FY 1991 to FY 1995. Based on the recognition that because of the
former Mid-Term Defense Program the JSDF had suitable strength as stipulated by
NDPO 76, the purpose of this program was to modernize the JSDF’s equipment and
balance frontline equipment with logistics.
On January 29, 1992, the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster
Relief Teams was revised, and it became possible for the JSDF to participate in
international disaster relief operations. Until now, the JSDF has sent its troops to do 8
disaster relief operations including providing relief during the 2004 Indian Ocean
earthquake.
On August 10, 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enforced and
the JSDF sent its Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) troops to the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Since this 1992 PKO, the JSDF has participated in
10 PKOs total.
Additionally, the Cold War ended around 1990. Because of the Revolutions of
1989 in Eastern Europe, the Eastern Block disappeared. The Soviet Union collapsed on
December 25, 1991, as Russian society became disordered. Japan lost the northern threat,
so the time to renew the NDPO had come.
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National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996 and Related Issues
On November 28, 1995, the Security Council and the Cabinet approved the
National Defense Program Outline for FY 1996 and beyond (NDPO 95). The purpose of
NDPO 95 was to show the defense posture needed to deal with disaster relief operations
and international peace cooperation needed to stabilize international society, and to
provide basic national defense.34 NDPO 95 stipulated that the GSDF should have 160,000
men and 900 tanks, the MSDF should have 50 destroyers, and the ASDF should have 300
fighters. In NDPO 95, the government maintained the Basic Defense Force Concept and
recognized the importance of the US-Japan security arrangement to stabilize international
society, especially in East Asia.
On December 14, 1995, in accordance with NDPO 95, the government approved
the Mid-Term Defense Program for from FY 1996 to FY2000. In this program, Japan
tried to modernize and consolidate the JSDF.35 On April 17, 1996, President Clinton and
Prime Minister Hashimoto signed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance
for the 21st Century. This was an agreement to review the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation, because the international situation had completely changed.36 On
September 23, 1997, the two governments signed the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan

34

Japan Defense Agency, "National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996," Defense of
Japan 2002, November 28, 1995,
http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2002/siryo/frame/dg140200500.htm (accessed March 20,
2009).
35

Japan Ministry of Defense, "Mid-Term Defense Program from FY 1996 to FY 2000," MidTerm Defense Program. December 14, 1995,
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/1996/mp96j.htm (accessed March 20, 2009).
36

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st
Century," Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, April 17, 1996, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/security/security.html (accessed March 20, 2009).

15

Defense Cooperation.37 Because of these guidelines, both governments started to
strengthen their mutual relationship in order to deal with situations in areas surrounding
Japan as well as an armed attack against Japan. In accordance with the guidelines, on
August 25, 1999, the Japanese government enforced the Law Concerning Measures to
Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan to
support the US armed forces, relieve refugees, conduct ship inspections, and execute
search and rescue activities in rear areas.38
On December 15, 2000, the government approved the Mid-Term Defense
Program from FY 2001 to FY2005 to strengthen anti-WMD and anti-guerrilla capability,
network centric warfare capability and disaster relief capability. 39 However this program
was stopped in FY 2004 because of the September 11 attack in the US, the War in
Afghanistan that has been ongoing since 2001, the Second Gulf War, and the
technological development of the Missile Defense (MD) system.
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The government approved the Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, and on
December 19, 2003, it decided to equip the JSDF with MD system, and renew the NDPO
and the Mid-Term Defense Program from FY 2005.40
In his policy statement in the National Diet in February 2002, Prime Minister
Koizumi announced that, because of the September 11 attack, Japan needed the
legislation in order to better respond to emergency situations.41 Politicians had not
discussed legislation for responding to emergency situations for a long time, because the
Japanese people had a strong antipathy to the military. In the period spanning 2003 to
2004 the government passed the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, the Civil
Protection Law, the US Military Actions Related Law, the Maritime Transportation
Restriction Law, the Prisoners of War Law, the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave
Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law, and other related laws. Each law was in
response to specific threatening events. On November 2, 2001, Premier Koizumi
enforced the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law allowing him to send the MSDF’s
replenishment tankers to the Indian Ocean to support a coalition fleet battling terrorists.
On June 26, 2003, after the cease fire of the Second Gulf War, he also passed the Law
Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq allowing Japan to
dispatch GSDF and ASDF units to assist the Iraqi people, and to logistically support the
coalition forces in Iraq.
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National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2005 and Related Issues
On December 10, 2004, the Security Council and the Cabinet approved the
National Defense Program Guidelines for in and after FY 2005 (NDPG 04) and the MidTerm Defense Program for from 2005 to 2009. NDPG 04 stipulated that the GSDF
should have 155,000 men and 600 tanks, the MSDF should have 47 destroyers, and the
ASDF should have 260 fighters. On February 19, 2005, Japan and the US announced a
joint statement on regional and global Common Strategic Objectives.42 This statement
was an epoch-making event to show and confirm each other’s strategic goals.
On January 9, 2007, the JDA was changed to the Japan ministry of defense
(MOD) to “improve defense policy-making/planning functions, to enhance and
strengthen responses to emergency situations, and to develop a structure that allows for
proactive efforts for the peace and stability of the international community.”43 On March
13, 2009, the Minister of Defense ordered the MSDF to send two destroyers to protect
merchant vessels related to Japan from Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden.
National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2005
NDPG 04 consisted of six parts: purpose, security environment surrounding Japan,
basic principles of Japan’s security policy, future defense forces, additional elements for
consideration, and attached table.
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Composition and Contents
Purpose
NDPG 04 was created to show the future posture of Japan’s security and defense
capability in accordance with the Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System.44 The
Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System explained why the government needed to
review NDPO 95, as follows:
Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion
by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the
increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,
activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats
as well as diverse contingencies that are likely to have a negative impact on the
peace and security of the nation (hereinafter “the new threats, etc.”) has been
urgently needed for the international community. For the peace and stability of
the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible
measures against such new threats, etc. through comprehensive and prompt
responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective
operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the
introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to a conclusion that the
whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.45
The government declared that NDPO 95 was out of date, so it wanted to keep
pace with the security fashion at the time to renew NDPO 95.
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Japan perceived the security environment surrounding Japan to be as follows:
1) The international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations
to peace and security, including the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles,
as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter “new threats and diverse
situations”).
44
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2) The use of military force now plays a broader role in the international
community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict.
3) Although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since
the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals,
continue to exist in the region.
4) The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait
relations remain uncertain.
5) Military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to
regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international
non-proliferation efforts.
6) China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize
its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces.
7) The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States,
based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important
role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region.46
Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy
Because of the security environment surrounding Japan, as stated above, NDPG
04 has two objectives, as follows:
1) To prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel
it and minimize any damage.
2) To improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances
that any threat will reach Japan in the first place.47
In order to achieve these two objectives, Japan tries to utilize three approaches:
Japan’s own efforts, Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and cooperation with the
international community.
Japan’s own efforts consist of three measures: diplomatic and other activities to
improve the international security environment, Japan’s integrated response bringing
together all relevant organizations and promoting mutual cooperation between the central
and local governments, future defense forces capable of effectively responding to new
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threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense
Force Concept that remain valid.48
In order to strengthen Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Japan decided to
promote the following measures: intelligence exchange, operational cooperation,
cooperation on MD equipment and technology exchange, and efforts to make the
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.49
To cooperate with the international community, Japan decided to promote the
following measures: diplomatic efforts including the strategic use of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and PKOs, reformation of the UN to make it more
effective and reliable, and promotion of a stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific
region, especially the Arc of Instability that affects Japan’s sea lines of communication. 50
Future Defense Forces
As a defense program, NDPG mentioned the future posture of defense forces. The
Japanese government changed its defense paradigm from the Basic Defense Force
Concept to the concept of future defense forces capable of effectively responding to new
threats and diverse situations, because there was little possibility of a Russian invasion of
Hokkaido. In other words, Japan is trying to change from the strategy based on a serious
view of the northern front to the strategy of a multirole JSDF to promote the following
capabilities: MD capability, anti-guerrilla/special forces capability, capability against the
invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, patrol and surveillance capability in the sea and
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airspace surrounding Japan to respond to violations of Japan’s airspace and the intrusion
of armed special-purpose ships and other similar vessels, disaster relief capability, and
PKO capability.51
In order to develop a multirole JSDF, the government is trying to enhance joint
operations capability by the establishment of the Joint Staff Office (JSO) and more
intelligence capability, and more efficient use of information technology and human
resources.52
Additional Elements for Consideration
In fulfilling NDPG, the Japanese government considered four elements: the
impact of severe fiscal conditions on the defense budget, revision of procurement and
research and development (R&D), maintenance of close relationships with local
governments located near defense facilities, and revision of NDPG 04 itself.
Attached table
NDPG 04 laid out the future JSDF posture. The main topics of Japan’s future
defense in NDPG 04 are as follows.
First, the GSDF tried to establish the Central Readiness Force for responses to
diverse situations and international missions, to change the normal eight divisions and six
brigades to 3 modernized comprehensive division/brigades in Hokkaido and 11
modernized readiness divisions/brigades in other islands, and to shift from the
conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented policy to the manpower-oriented policy for
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multi-missions.53 Second, the MSDF attempted to reorganize the Fleet Escort Force, the
Fleet Submarine Force, and the Fleet Air Wing within the Self Defense Fleet to provide
units for the Commander in Chief of the Self Defense Fleet as an effective force user.54
Third, the ASDF attempted to modernize and reorganize fighter units by the abolishment
of the definition of fighter supporters and fighter interceptors, and the possession of aerial
refueling cargo-tankers.55 Finally, the JSDF attempted to establish the JSO and equip it
with a joint MD system by FY 2011.56 (See APPENDIX C)
Relationship with the Mid-Term Defense Program
NDPG 04 provided a 10-year vision of Japan’s security. 57 In order to achieve the
NDPG’s goal step-by-step, the Japanese government planned to make Mid-Term Defense
Programs every five years. For example, the MSDF had to reduce its destroyers from 50
to 47, but it was difficult to do so in five years. In the Mid-Term Defense Program, the
MSDF made a plan to reduce the number temporarily to 48. In the program, the
government showed more specifics than the NDPG with respect to how many and what
kind of equipment it would procure during the term. The total amount of defense-related
expenditures was limited to about 24.24 trillion yen in FY 2005 prices. 58
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Characteristics and Comparison with US strategies/QDR
Japan does not have formal National Security/Defense/Military Strategy
documents such as the US, but this does not mean that Japan has not developed programs
to achieve its goals. Actually, in NDPO 76 and NDPO 95, the government wrote its
objectives in terms of defense policy only. In NDPG 04, Japan attempted to make a
whole governmental effort to clarify its security goals for a decade. The actual
description related to its security policy was minimal, but the description was still a great
leap for Japan’s security policy. On December 10, 2004, just after the approval of NDPG
04, the Chief Cabinet Secretary announced, “The new NDPG spells out both Japan’s
vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which
underlie that vision.”59
The NDPG was a fairly short document, just a few thousands words. In order to
achieve the goal, supplemental documents had to be developed. The Mid-Term Defense
Program supplemented the NDPG’s defense policy, but no other documents
supplemented other parts of Japan’s security policy related to the NDPG. Japan’s security
policy has not been coordinated across the government yet. This remains a huge problem
in the present NDPG system.
Each state should have a way of developing strategies to secure itself. In order to
highlight the NDPG’s shortcomings, I would like to review US strategies which are
relatively rational and structured. They also influence Japan’s security policy.
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US National Security Strategy
On March 16, 2006, the White House issued the National Security Strategy (NSS)
of the United States of America. It stated, “The goal of our statecraft is to help create a
world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and
conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to
provide enduring security for the American people.”60 In order to achieve this goal, the
US has outlined broad objectives:
1) Champion aspirations for human dignity;
2) Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks
against us and our friends;
3) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
4) Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with
weapons of mass destruction;
5) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free
trade;
6) Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the
infrastructure of democracy;
7) Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global
power;
8) Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and
opportunities of the 21st century; and
9) Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.
After explaining the international situation, the NSS stressed the importance of
international cooperation, because it is difficult for the US to achieve the goal by itself
even though it is the strongest military power in the world.
Japan has a similar strategic goal: to provide enduring security for the Japanese
people, as stated in the Basic Policy for National Defense which was approved on May
20, 1957. The Basic Policy for National Defense said, “The aim of national defense is to
prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of
60
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protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy.”61 In order
to achieve this goal, Japan proposes to achieve the following objectives:
-To support the UN activities and promote international cooperation to achieve
world peace.
-To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish
the foundations required for national security.
-Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient
defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation.
-To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements, until the UN can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent
such acts in the future.
This was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet.
This document is dated, but it is still in effect in its unrevised form. NDPG 04 has a
strategic role to play in fulfilling the Basic Policy for National Defense, which states,
“Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country.
In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and
its alliance partner—the US—. Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to
improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any
new threats.”62 In NDPG 04, Japan declared that not only the JSDF’s effort, but also a
government-wide effort are key to securing Japan. In this sense, Japan’s national security
strategy essentially consists of the national’s goals as outlined in the Basic Policy for
National Defense, and the means to achieve them, NDPG 04.63
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US National Defense Strategy
In June 2008, the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States was
published by the US Department of Defense (DOD). This supports the NSS in providing
security for the American people.
In the NDS, the DOD outlines five key objectives: defend the homeland, win the
long war, promise security, deter conflict, and win the nation’s war.64 In order to achieve
these objectives, the DOD presented five approaches: shaping the choice of key states,
preventing adversaries from acquiring or using WMD, strengthening and expanding
alliances and partnerships, securing US strategic access and retaining freedom of action,
and integrating and unifying our efforts.65
In the “basic principles of Japan’s security policy” of NDPG 04, the Japanese
government outlined two objectives and three approaches, as mentioned above.66 The
MOD and other governmental organizations have attempted to achieve these objectives
using the three basic approaches, but the MOD has the largest role. Similarly, the “basic
principles of Japan’s security policy” are embedded as goals in the National Defense
Strategy.

64

Department of Defense, 2008 Natioanl Defense Strategy (Arlington, Virginia: Department of
Defense, 2008), 6-13.
65

Department of Defense. 2008 Natioanl Defense Strategy. 13-18.

66

Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2008. 397-399. Two objectives are to prevent any
threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage, and to improve
the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the
first place. Three approaches are Japan’s own efforts, Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and cooperation
with the international community.

27

US National Military Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review
The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, published
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), supports the NSS’ and NDS’s goals and objectives. In
spite of the fact the newest NMS is older than the present NDS published in 2008, I will
compare the NMS with NDPG 04 to highlight the layered US strategic structure from the
NSS to the NMS.
In the NMS, the JCS outlined three military objectives: to protect the US, to
prevent conflict and surprise attack, and to prevail against adversaries.67 In order to
achieve these objectives, the JCS presented desired attributes, capabilities and functions.
The US Armed Forces should be fully integrated, expeditionary, networked,
decentralized and adaptable, and have decision superiority and lethality. And the JCS
presented the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing concept to defend the homeland, operate four forward
regions, and defeat two regional adversaries and achieve a result in one of them.68
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report of February 6, 2006 is a
document periodically issued by the DOD to achieve the objectives of the NDS. In
accordance with the Section 118, Title 10 of the US Code,
The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year
evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a
"quadrennial defense review") of the national defense strategy, force structure,
67
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force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the
defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining
and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a
defense program for the next 20 years.69
The QDR proposed four focus areas: defeating terrorist networks, defending the
homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and
preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.70 These four
areas comprise Force Planning Construct to defend the homeland, prevail in the War on
Terror and conduct irregular operations, and conduct and win conventional campaigns.71
This Force Planning Construct departed from the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing concept. The QDR
also provided a barometer of defense budget limitations and equipment to possess in four
years.72
In NDPG 04, the government defined Japan’s defense forces as “the ultimate
guarantee of its national security, representing Japan’s will and ability to repel any threat
that might reach its shores.”73 That was the JSDF’s intermediate objective. In order to
achieve this objective, NDPG 04 established three measures: effective response to the
new threat and diverse situations, preparations to deal with full-scale invasion, and
proactive efforts to improve the international environment. An attached table indicated
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the JSDF’s future size more concretely than the NMS. Because NDPG 04 described the
JSDF’s intermediate objectives and appropriate size, it is similar to the NMS and the
QDR. Japan also has the Mid-Term Defense Program as a five-year plan to improve the
JSDF to achieve the NDPG’s force objectives. This program is more concrete than the
NDPG, so the NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Program are somewhat similar to the
QDR’s role.
In conclusion, NDPG 04 contains elements of the NSS, NDS, NMS and QDR.
Because of its name, the National Defense Program Guidelines, it appears to play a role
most similar to the NDS. On the other hand, it was made by the Cabinet, so that it has a
broader security role to the NSS. Except for the MOD, ministries having responsibility
for the national security do not seriously regard NDPG 04 as supporting the NSS,
because of its defense label, in spite of its contents. NDPG functions not so much to
fulfill broad goals such as NSS establishes, but at the level of the NDS, NMS and QDR
goals and objectives.
Legal Basis of Japan’s Security and Defense Policy
This section explains the layered structure of Japan’s security/defense policy and
the NDPG’s place in it.
Constitution and the Governmental View on its Article 9
In accordance with Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, Japan will never
possess “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,” and renounces war and
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.74 However the

74

“Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of
settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and

30

Japanese government considers that Article 9 does not negate a sovereign power’s
inherent right of self-defense, so Japan possesses the JSDF at “the minimum level of
armed force needed to exercise the right.”75 Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations also admits the inherent right of self-defense.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.76
On December 16, 1959, the Supreme Court of Japan, using its power of judicial
review, passed judgment on a case of Violation of the Special Criminal Law. This law
was enacted as a result of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security
Treaty between Japan and the United States of America. In this case, the constitutionality
of the right of self-defense and the US-Japan alliance were recognized as follows:
This Article renounces the so-called war and prohibits the maintenance of the socalled war potential, but certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right
of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism
advocated in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or
nonresistance... It is needless to say that we are free to choose whatever method or
means deemed appropriate to accomplish our objectives in the light of the actual
international situation, as long as such measures are for the purpose of preserving
the peace and security of our country. Article 9 of the Constitution does not at all
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prohibit our country from seeking a guarantee from another country in order to
maintain the peace and security of the country.77
The Japanese government considers that Japan possesses the inherent right of
collective self-defense but that it should not be exercised because it could exceed the
minimum level authorized by Article 9 of the Constitution. Therefore according to the
US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960, both states’ common defense actions can only deal
with an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of
Japan.78
SDF Act and Related Regulations
The SDF Act stipulates that the JSDF mission is to defend Japan from a direct or
indirect invasion, to maintain public order, to deal with “a situation occurring in areas
surrounding Japan that may severely affect the peace and security of Japan,” and to
maintain the peace and security of the international society.79 Article 7 of the SDF Act
says that the Prime Minister has the supreme power of command and supervises the
JSDF.80 In addition to the SDF Act, there are several other laws created to provide the
domestic legal basis for SDF actions: the International Peace Cooperation Law to attend
UN PKOs; the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to send fleet replenishment tankers
to the Indian Ocean since fall 2001; the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International
Disaster-Relief Teams to conduct international disaster relief operations such as the large
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scale earthquake off Indonesia’s Sumatra Island and consequent tsunami in the Indian
Ocean; and legislation for responses to situations such as the Armed Attack Situation
Response Law, the Civil Protection Law, the US Military Actions Related Measures Law,
the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law, the Law Regarding the Use of Specific
Public Facilities, the Prisoners of War Law, the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave
Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law, the Ship Inspection Operations Law and
the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in
Areas Surrounding Japan. In addition, Japan has ratified the Biological Weapons
Convention, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other arms control and humanitarian
treaties81.
Basic Policy for National Defense and Other Basic Principles
The National Defense Council adopted and the Cabinet approved the Basic Policy
for National Defense in 1957. This is the basic foundation of Japan’s security and defense
policy. In addition, there are other basic principles: exclusive defense-oriented policy; not
becoming a military power; the three non-nuclear principles; and ensuring civilian
control.
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Exclusive Defense-oriented Policy
According to the Governmental Written Answer on November 5, 1985,regarding
Councilor Hata’s Question on Basic Defense Policy “The exclusively defense-oriented
policy means that Japan will not employ a defensive force unless and until an armed
attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such a case, only the
minimum force necessary to defend itself may be used. Furthermore, only the minimum
defense forces necessary for self-defense should be retained and used. This exclusively
defense-oriented policy is a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of
the Constitution.”82 In Japan, the term “strategic defensive” means the same as “exclusive
defense-oriented policy.” Under this policy, the JSDF will repulse an enemy’s attack not
in the enemy’s territory, but around or in Japan. Japan will not carry out a preemptive
strike, the government refrains from possessing Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, attack aircraft carriers, or long-range ground
attack cruise missiles, because possessing these offensive weapons which can cause mass
destruction exceeds the minimum level of individual self-defense.83
Not Becoming a Military Power
According to the MOD, “There is no established definition for the term ‘military
power.’ However, not becoming a military power that could threaten the security of other
countries means that Japan will not possess more military force than is necessary for self82
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defense and that could pose a threat to other countries.”84 This policy strongly takes into
consideration neighboring states’ fears that Japan will be a military power again. For
example, the Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo expressed the fear, “North Korea’s
missile launch will provide decisive support to Japanese right-wing forces who want their
country to become a military powerhouse.”85
Three Non-nuclear Principles
Japan is the only state which has been bombed by atomic weapons, so the
Japanese people have a strong antipathy toward nuclear weapons. On December 11, 1967,
at the Budget Committee in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Sato said, “My
responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear
weapons, in line with Japan's Peace Constitution.”86 Simultaneously, Japan relies on the
US nuclear deterrent against the nuclear threat, according to NDPG 04.87 Japan also
attempts to contribute to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty System and
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Ensuring Civilian Control
Historically, the Empire of Japan, led by the military, started the World War II in
the Pacific because the Prime Minister and the Imperial Diet could not control the
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prerogative of supreme command executed by the Imperial Japanese Army/Navy General
Staff Office.88 Because of this, Japan decided to utilize a civilian control system under the
present Constitution. The Japanese style of civilian control is as follows:
1) The Japanese people are represented by civilians in the Diet, which makes
legislative and budgetary decisions on matters such as the authorized number
of SDF Regular Personnel and principal institutions of the SDF. It also
approves defense operations.
2) As part of its general administrative functions, the Cabinet has entire authority
related to defense.
3) The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in
the Cabinet to be civilians. The Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the
Cabinet, is the supreme commander of the SDF. The Minister of Defense,
who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control
over SDF activities.
4) The Security Council of Japan within the Cabinet discusses important defense
matters.
5) At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is in charge of
administrative work related to national defense and controls the SDF. The
Minister of Defense is assisted in planning political measures and
administration by the Senior Vice-Minister and two Parliamentary
Secretaries.89
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MOD’s Annual White Paper: Defense of Japan
According to the Vice-Minister’s Meeting Agreement of October 24, 1963, white
papers are defined as government publications edited by Japanese government offices to
show citizens the actual condition of Japanese politics, society, and economy. 90 The
MOD’s annual white paper “Defense of Japan” is designed to deepen citizens’ and
international society’s recognition of Japan’s basic defense policy.91 This paper makes
known the MOD and the JSDF’s official position on the security environment
surrounding Japan, the basics of Japan’s defense policy and the build-up of its defense
capability, and the measures of the defense of Japan.
US-Japan Security Arrangements
In the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee issued by Secretary
of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso, and Minister
of Defense Kyuma on May 1, 2007, Japan and the US confirmed, “The U.S.-Japan
security relationship is the bedrock of Japan's defense and the keystone of peace and
security in the Asia-Pacific region.”92 There are three reasons. First, an enemy’s attack
against Japan will prompt a confrontation with the US because of Article 5 of the USJapan Security Treaty. This arrangement is a strong deterrence to potential attacks.
Second, Article 6 of the treaty said, “For the purpose of contributing to the security of

90

Senior Vice-Ministers' Meeting, "Management of white papers," White Papers, October 24,
1963, http://www.gioss.or.jp/clip/hakusyo_mousiawasws38h13.pdf (accessed March 25, 2009).
91

Japan Ministry of Defense, “White Papers,” Japan Ministry of Defense, 2009,
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/wp/index.html (accessed March 25, 2009).
92

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee," JapanU.S. Security Arrangements, May 1, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/security/scc/joint0705.html (accessed March 25, 2009).

37

Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United
States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas
in Japan.” This means that the US-Japan Security Arrangements can contribute to
international stability.93 Third, Article 2 said, “The Parties will contribute toward the
further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their
free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which
these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.
They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will
encourage economic collaboration between them.”94 This treaty is a basis not only of
mutual security but also of a mutual economic, political and social relationship. This USJapan Security Arrangement is a guarantee to allow economic prosperity and political
legitimacy in the world. This recognition was reconfirmed by President Obama on
February 24, 2009, when he met Prime Minister Aso in the White House, “The alliance
that we have is the cornerstone of security in East Asia.”95
Arms Export Policy
On April 21, 1967, at the National Diet, Prime Minister Sato declared the Three
Principles on Arms Export, as follows:
The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be
permitted:
1) Communist Bloc countries;
2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions; or
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3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in
international conflicts.96
On February 27, 1976, Prime Minister Miki provided additional principles as
follows:
With regard to the export of “arms,” the government, from the standpoint of Japan
as a pacifist country, has always dealt with cautiously with the problem of arms
exports to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will
continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not
promote arms exports.
i) The export of “arms” to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be
permitted.
ii) The export of “arms” to area other than the areas subject to the Three
Principles, shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.97
According these principles, Japan restrains itself from exporting arms not only to
Communist Bloc states but also to any other states except the US.98 These arms export
policies have contributed to the non-proliferation of armed conflict in the world. On the
other hand, the policy causes issues with respect to Japan’s attempts to develop weapons
of its own. These principles increase the costs of weapons produced in Japan, which in
turn inflates the defense budget. The relatively small amount of domestic weapons
production makes the defense industry inefficient. Japan cannot provide weapons to some
developing states which need to build a system of national security. Therefore some
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politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Business Federation
have insisted on reviewing these policies to relax exporting weapons.99
Security Council of Japan
The Security Council of Japan established in the Cabinet discusses important
matters of defense and emergency situations.100 The Prime Minister has to inquire about
matters such as the following:
1) The Basic Policy of National Defense
2) The National Defense Program Guidelines
3) Industrial management plans related to the NDPG
4) Basic policies and matters on responses to armed attack situations, situations
in areas surrounding Japan, the JSDF actions to contribute to the international
security, etc.
Members of this council are the Prime Minister as the chairman, the Chief
Cabinet Secretary, the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, the Minister of
Finance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry,
the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Minister of Defense, and
the Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission. The Assistant Chief Cabinet
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Secretary for Security and Crisis Management of the Cabinet Secretariat is in charge of
administrative works of this council.101
In general, members of this council except the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet
Secretary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense are not actively
involved. The council adopted NDPG 04 and deliberated on the Mid-Term Defense
Program, but it has not discussed other supplemental documents related to the NDPG
such as industrial management plans. Japan’s actual security policy is managed by
complex dynamics among the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, LDP defense
lawmakers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the MOD.
Prime Minister Abe attempted to change the Security Council to the US-style
National Security Council (NSC) in 2007 to strengthen his cabinet’s security
management capability by establishing an Executive Office. However his attempt was
suspended because he resigned. His successor, Fukuda, was not interested in the
establishment of the National Security Council.102 The LDP defense lawmakers still
suggest establishing the National Security Council.103
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Chapter 2: The Process of Making NDPG 04
In this chapter, I would like to show the process of making NDPG 04 in order to
examine the process of making NDPG 09. The Japanese government is reviewing NDPG
04 to make NDPG 09, so it is necessary to know what factors affected making NDPG 04
to estimate NDPG 09’s contents.
Outline
According to Defense of Japan 2007, the Japanese government took three main
steps in examining NDPG 04, which was approved on December 10, 2004; the Defense
Posture Review Board within the JDA examined it from September 2001 to December
2004; the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities set up under the Prime Minister
examined it from April to October 2004; and the Security Council of Japan examined it
from October to December 2004.104 These actors considered the international and
domestic situations and concluded by establishing the future posture of Japan’s security
and defense.
New Threats and Diverse Situations
NDPG 04 said that the JSDF had to possess the capability to respond effectively
to the new threats and diverse situations, to prepare for a full-scale invasion, and to
proactively improve the international security environment.
New Threats and Diverse Situations
In particular, the JSDF decided to strengthen capability in the following
situations: response to ballistic missile attacks, response to guerilla and special operations
forces attacks, response to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, patrol and
104
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surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan and response to the violation of
Japan’s airspace and the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships and other similar
vessels, and response to large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical,
and radiological) disasters.105
Ballistic Missile Proliferation
Ballistic missiles are weapons which are vertically launched by rocket engines,
follow an inertial parabolic trajectory after burning out their rocket fuel, and reach far
targets.106 Ballistic missiles have strong destructive power by themselves because of the
kinetic energy of a rapidly falling object. In addition, most ballistic missiles can carry
WMD warheads. Because of the speed involved, it is difficult to shoot down or destroy
ballistic missiles and their warheads in flight.
On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched something. On September 4, 1998,
the Korean Central News Agency said, “The rocket was launched in the direction of 86
degrees at a launching station in Musudan-ri, Hwadae county, North Hamgyong Province
at 12:07 August 31, Juche 87 (1998) and correctly put the satellite into orbit at 12 hours
11 minutes 53 seconds in four minutes 53 seconds.”107 North Korea officially called the
satellite “Kwangmyongsong No. 1.”108
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The Japanese government had been attempting to gather information on this
launch since the middle of August. After the North Korean launch and the intelligence
analysis of it, the Japanese government announced its judgment:
1) The flying object was Taep’o-dong 1 classified by the US, and it was a twostage solid fuel rocket.
2) This launch could not insert any payload into orbit.
3) There is high possibility that the launch was a ballistic missile launch.
4) This missile ranges 1500km or more. North Korea acquired technology to
produce ballistic missiles capable of ranging all of Japan.109
According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, North Korea already had
200 or more Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles which could strike Japan. Japan
was worried about this North Korean missile threat. Therefore the government started to
examine the feasibility of possessing a MD system and a satellite information gathering
system.110
Threats of Guerilla and Special Operations Forces Attacks
On September 17, 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korean National
Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang to establish “a fruitful
political, economic and cultural relationship”. They agreed on the Japan-DPRK
Pyongyang Declaration. During the discussions about the declaration, Mr. Kim admitted
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that, from the1970’s to the 1980’s, North Korea had abducted some Japanese citizens.111
According to the Japanese government, 17 Japanese citizens were abducted by North
Korea.112
These abductions were conducted by North Korean special agents who infiltrated
Japan using armed special-purpose ships including midget submarines. This meant that
North Korea had and likely still has enough capability to covertly send its agents and
special forces to Japan to conduct illegal operations such as sabotage. This remains a
present danger to Japanese society and infrastructure. The JDA recognized the
importance of cooperating with the National Police Agency to deal with guerilla and
special operations forces attacks, and in 2000 it amended the Agreement on the
Maintenance of Public Order in the Public Security Operations between the JDA and the
National Public Safety Commission.113
Possibility of the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands
Japan consists of 6,800 or more islands. The Nansei Islands in particular are
numerous. The Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea belong to the Nansei Islands and
Japan has effectively possessed and controlled them since 1895. The Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs of Japan has presented Japan’s basic view on its sovereignty over the Senkaku
Islands as follows:
It was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no
trace of having been under the control of China. Based on this confirmation, the
Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to erect a
marker on the Islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the
territory of Japan. Since then, the Senkaku Islands have continuously remained as
an integral part of the Nansei Shoto Islands which are the territory of Japan. These
islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands which were
ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance with Article II of
the Treaty of Shimonoseki which came into effect in May of 1895.Accordingly,
the Senkaku Islands are not included in the territory which Japan renounced under
Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Senkaku Islands have been
placed under the administration of the United States of America as part of the
Nansei Shoto Islands, in accordance with Article III of the said treaty, and are
included in the area, the administrative rights over which were reverted to Japan
in accordance with the Agreement Between Japan and the United States of
America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed on 17 June
1971. The facts outlined herein clearly indicate the status of the Senkaku Islands
being part of the territory of Japan.114
However, in 1971, based on the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East’s research that suggested huge seabed resources exist in the area, China and Taiwan
started to claim sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. On February 25, 1992, the Chinese
government enacted the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and
officially claimed the Senkaku Islands as Chinese territory named Diaoyu Island.
Article 2. The PRC's territorial sea refers to the waters adjacent to its territorial
land. The PRC's territorial land includes the mainland and its offshore islands,
Taiwan and the various affiliated islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands,
Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that
belong to the People's Republic of China.115
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In March 2004, 7 Chinese activists illegally landed on Uotsuri Island, which is the
main island of the Senkaku Islands.116 There is high probability that this activity was
supported by the Chinese government. In addition, China has attempted to strengthen its
naval power to protect such maritime national interests. The US Department of Defense
has estimated that China is trying to control the Senkaku Islands.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is developing forces to support its
strategy of “offshore defense,” which includes developing the capability to protect
China’s island and maritime claims, including Taiwan and the Spratly and
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands.117
Actually, the PLAN first sent 10 or more naval combatant ships around the
Senkaku Islands in May 1999.118 The PLAN deployed many more vessels to the area
after this demonstration. So the Japanese government has had to consider some
countermeasures.
Violation of Japan’s Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special-purpose Ships
The US Air Force established the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around
Japan during the American occupation of Japan. After the San Francisco Treaty and the
return of Okinawa to Japan, the ASDF assumed control of this ADIZ. The ADIZ is an
area established in the vicinity of territorial airspace boundaries to “facilitate early
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aircraft identification of all aircraft.”119 If an unidentified aircraft enters into the ADIZ
and is suspected of violating Japan’s territorial airspace, the ASDF scrambles fighters to
monitor and warn away the offending aircraft. From 1996 to 2004, there were about 1570
ASDF scrambles, about 1110 of which were caused by Russian aircraft intrusions.120
There was less Russian military activity in the period of NDPO 96 than in the Cold War
era, but the ASDF was continuously put into tense situations.
More serious situations happened on the sea. In September 1996 and June 1998,
North Korean midget submarines attempted to infiltrate South Korean territorial waters.
On 18 September a military submarine had been found grounded in shallow water
near the coastal city of Kangnung, one of the major ports on the eastern coast of
the Republic of Korea. Based upon the accumulation of concrete evidence,
including arms and ammunition made in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, the team had determined that the submarine belonged to the armed forces
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and that the occupants of the
submarine were all officers of the regular army of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. It had also been determined that all of them had gone ashore,
infiltrating the territory of the Republic of Korea.121
The Government of Japan worried about these incidents because there was high
possibility that foreign submarines had infiltrated Japanese territorial waters. On
December 24, 1996, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet established the
Response Regarding Foreign Submarines Navigating Underwater in Territorial and
Inland Waters of Japan. The MSDF conducted patrols to detect such submarines.
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Not only submarines but also ships carrying special agents became serious threats
to Japan’s security. On the morning of March 23, 1999, a MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft
found three suspicious ships in Japanese waters near the Noto Peninsula and
Sadogashima Island. MSDF destroyers and P-3Cs attempted to stop them with warning
shots and bombings, but they fled to the northwest. Destroyers and P-3Cs chased them to
the end of Japan’s ADIZ. The three suspicious ships were presumed to enter a North
Korean port.122 On December 22, 2001, a MSDF P-3C found a suspicious ship in the East
China Sea, which was the same type of ship as in the 1999 incident. Japan Coast Guard
(JCG) and MSDF ships attempted to stop it, but it fled in the direction of China. JCG
ships fired warning shots; then the suspicious ship launched a counterattack and damaged
the JCG ships and crews. The JCG ships fired in self-defense, and the suspicious ship lost
the capability to escape. The ship then blew itself up and sank. On September 11, 2002,
the JCG salvaged the ship and confirmed that it was a special agent ship of North Korea
used to send agents to Japan.123 The Japanese government decided to strengthen the
capabilities of the JCG and the MSDF to deal with armed special-purpose ships. In 1999,
the JDA and the JCG made a joint response guideline, the Manual on Joint Strategies
concerning Unidentified Vessels.124
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Large-scale and/or Special-type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological)
Disasters
The Japanese Archipelago is located on the Pacific “ring of fire.”125 Besides
active volcanoes, centers of seismic activity and faults, there are many trenches in and
around Japan. Historically, every decade an earthquake registering a magnitude of 7 on
the Richter scale hits Japan. Japan also has many interlacing shorelines easily damaged
by tsunamis. In addition, many typhoons hit the Japanese Islands every year. The
Japanese people are living in a natural disaster zone.
For example, Miyakejima Island, located 110 miles south of Tokyo, is a huge
volcano. On July 8, 2000, the volcano started to erupt. This eruption was so active and
dangerous that the Japanese government decided to evacuate all the islanders to Tokyo,
because this island’s village belonged to the Metropolis of Tokyo. The JSDF dispatched
troops, ships and airplanes to reconnoiter the volcano and the damage, transport people
and vehicles, and support people’s daily lives.126
In addition to natural disasters, Japan has to prepare for special-type artificial
disasters. For example, on September 30, 1999, a critical nuclear accident occurred at a
uranium processing plant operated by JCO Co., Ltd., in Tokai Village, Ibaraki Prefecture.
According to the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan, JCO workers ignored a
government-approved procedure and caused a nuclear criticality at 10:35 am. The
Nuclear Safety Commission determined, “They seem(ed) to have fed seven batches of
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uranyl nitrate solution (work unit: about 16.6 kgU) into the precipitation tank which was
designed to limit the mass to 1 batch (2.4 kgU), using a 5-liter stainless steel bucket and a
funnel.” 127 At 6:15 am on the next day, this accident was terminated by workers’
desperate actions to drain the cooling water of the precipitation tank, which stopped the
chain reaction. Two workers were killed by radiation exposure. The GSDF sent the 101
Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit to Tokai Village to decontaminate
the village. At the time, the Unit’s chemical/radiological/nuclear reconnaissance vehicle
did not have the capability to block neutron beams, so that it was difficult to support this
critical termination operation. After this incident, the JDA decided to give neutron beamshield capability to the vehicle, and by authority of the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster
Countermeasures, created procedures to dispatch units.128
In March 1995, members of a cult spread sarin on the Tokyo subway and killed
12 people.129 On September 11, 2001, Islamic jihadists attacked the World Trade Center
in New York and killed thousands of people. Japan and the international society are
facing threats of large-scale and special-type disasters. The Government of Japan has
seriously examined how to possess the capability to deal with such disasters.
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Possibility of Full-Scale Invasion
The Japanese government has thought, “The likelihood of full-scale invasion of
Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future.”130 In the
period of NDPO 96, we never did see signs of a full-scale invasion. However, “because
the original role of our defense force is to cope with full-scale invasion and
reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time,” Japan has
decided to keep its minimum level capability against full-scale invasion.131
International Security Environment and JSDF activities
The most serious impacts on the international security environment in the period
of NDPO 96 were the September 11 attack and the Global War on Terror including the
Second Gulf War and the War in Afghanistan. The MOD recognized these situations as
follows:
The activities of non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations,
present a serious threat. Acts of terrorism are occurring in every region of the
world. The United States and other countries are continuing efforts in the fight
against terrorism and have achieved some success, but have confronted severe
challenges presented in Iraq and Afghanistan – which are regarded by the United
States as front lines in this fight – and a crunch in the numbers of deployable
troops to missions overseas is becoming a significant issue… Accordingly, each
state continues to enhance its military capabilities in line with its resources and
circumstances, and pursue international cooperation and partnership in security
areas.132
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The Japanese government thought the best way to reduce the chances that any
threat would reach Japan was to improve international security in the first place.133 Japan
reached this conclusion by observing international activities from 1997 to 2005.
Anti-Terrorism Operation in the Indian Ocean
As a result of Prime Minister Koizumi’s enthusiasm, the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law was enacted on November 2, 2001, only one month after its presentation
to the National Diet. He expressed that Japan would contribute to fighting international
terrorism.
I myself and the people of Japan are together with President George W. Bush and
the people of the United States in that we shall never forget the September 11
tragedy and our common resolve to fight against terrorism. Japan is resolved to
continue to stand by the United States in its determined fight against terrorism,
and to contribute actively, on its own initiative, to the efforts of the international
community, in order to prevent and eradicate international terrorism and to ensure
that such terrorist acts will never be repeated.134
In accordance with the law, the MSDF dispatched fleet replenishment tankers to
the Indian Ocean to provide diesel fuel, fuel for helicopters and water for combatant ships
of the Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO). The law expired on November 1, 2007,
but on January 16, 2008, the Japanese government enacted a new Replenishment Support
Special Measures Law. This MSDF fleet replenishment operation has been conducted
since November 2001 except for a three-month hiatus. This operation strongly
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contributes to the MIO, because MIO ships save time otherwise needed to refuel at ports
and can conduct operations more effectively.135
JSDF Iraq Reconstruction and Support Operation
In order to assist Iraqi’s self-help efforts to stabilize their society and establish a
democratic government after the collapse of the Hussein administration, Japan decided to
conduct humanitarian and reconstruction support in Iraq in accordance with UNSCR
1483. On August 1, 2003, the Koizumi administration enacted the Law Concerning
Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities
for Ensuring Security in Iraq, allowing Japan to dispatch GSDF troops to the Al
Muthanna Governorate, Iraq, and ASDF C-130 transport aircrafts to Kuwait to support
the UN and coalitional operations. From February 2004 to July 2006, GSDF troops
conducted medical, water supply and infrastructure reconstructing operations.136 ASDF
finished its operation at the end of 2008, because of “the judgment that the objective of
the ASDF's mission had now been fulfilled.”137
Continuous dispatches of JSDF troops to the Middle East are the largest
operations Japan has conducted to contribute to international society. As the second
largest economic power in the world, Japan has learned precious lessons through these
operations and has recognized the need to strengthen cooperative activities to support
international peace.
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Peace Keeping Operations
In accordance with the International Peace Cooperation Law passed in 1992,
Japan can participate in UN PKOs if the following five conditions are met. These ensure
Japanese PKOs are conducted within constitutional limitations.
1. Warring parties must reach a ceasefire accord,
2. Warring parties, including those from the countries in which the U.N.
peacekeeping force are to operate, must consent to the U.N. force’s operations
and Japan’s participation in the operations of the U.N. force,
3. The U.N. peacekeeping force must take a neutral stance; they should not side
with any particular warring party,
4. Japan must ensure that the SDF can withdraw from operations of the U.N.
peacekeeping force if either one of the three principles stated above is not met,
and
5. The use of weapons by SDF members participating in operations of the U.N.
peacekeeping force should be limited as much as possible to situations that are
conceivably necessary to protect the members’ lives.138
From 2002 to 2004, Japan dispatched a GSDF Engineer Group and some
headquarters personnel to provide logistical support to the UN Mission of Support in East
Timor (UNMISET).139 The total number of troops and personnel was approximately
2,300, which made it the largest PKO in Japan’s history. In particular, GSDF engineers
repaired many social infrastructures such as roads and bridges. At the end of this mission,
the GSDF Engineer Group donated construction machines to East Timor and taught
people how to operate them. This kind of support of East Timor by Japan was acclaimed
by the United Nations as being “uniquely Japanese.”140
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International Disaster Relief Operations
In October 1998, a strong hurricane hit Honduras, and the Honduran government
requested the Japanese government to dispatch a JSDF medical team. In accordance with
the amended International Disaster Relief Law passed in 1992, the JSDF sent its medical
team and air transportation unit there from November to December 1998.141 This was the
first international disaster relief operation for the JSDF. It was difficult to maintain
logistics lines from Japan to Honduras, but the unit decontaminated 33,000 square meters
and treated about 4,000 citizens. The JDA regarded this operation as a great success to
contribute to international society, and decided to attend more international disaster relief
operations.
Confidence Building Measures and Security/Defense Exchanges
After the Cold War, Japan and the international society recognized that it was
very important to establish trustworthy relationships through defense exchanges and joint
exercises to prevent unexpected disputes and arms races. Not only the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs but also the JDA/JSDF started to establish such defense relationships
with neighbor states.
Bi/multilateral security and defense dialogues are easy and good ways for states to
understand each other. In the period of NDPO 96, Japan had bilateral dialogues with
Korea, Russia, China, Australia, the UK, and other Rim-Pacific states, and attended some
multinational security conferences such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Japan also
hosted some multinational security/defense forums such as the Tokyo Defense Forum
and the Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar in which I joined in the planning. For
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example, in October 1998, Japanese Premier Obuchi and Korean President Kim agreed to
strengthen their defense relationship as follows:
The two leaders welcomed the security dialogue as well as the defense exchanges
at various levels between the two countries and decided to further strengthen them.
The leaders also shared the view on the importance of both countries to
steadfastly maintain their security arrangements with the United States while at
the same time further strengthen efforts on multilateral dialogue for the peace and
stability of the Asia-Pacific region.142
The JDA thought that bilateral joint exercises strengthened trust and relationships
established by dialogues. For example, the MSDF had the first joint search and rescue
exercises with Russia in 1998 and with Korea in 1999. The JSDF also recognized that
multinational exercises are good opportunities to strengthen mutual relationships. So, in
the 2000’s, Japan increased its participation from not only attending them to also hosting
them. For example, in 2002 the MSDF hosted the Second Western Pacific Submarine
Rescue Exercise (Pacific Reach). This was the first multilateral exercise hosted by Japan.
This Pacific Reach exercise has been held every two or three years, and I joined Pacific
Reach 04 in Korea as a Weapons Officer in the Japanese submarine Sachishio. In
October 2004, the government also hosted the Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise
for MIO.143
Arms Controls
Japan believes that arms control contributes to world peace for the following
reasons:
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Firstly, Japan should vigorously promote disarmament and non - proliferation
based on the philosophy of peace on which Japan stands, as a state which has
responsibility for demonstrating the devastation of nuclear weapons as the only
state that has suffered the horrific effects of atomic bombs. Secondly, in order to
stabilize the security environment of the region surrounding Japan from the
viewpoint of ensuring peace and security in Japan, it is important to … to prevent
weapons of mass destruction from proliferation... Thirdly, in reaction to the
accelerated aggravation of the misery of war due to an increase in the destructive
and killing power of weapons, there has become an increasing need to work on
disarmament and non - proliferation through a humanitarian approach. Fourthly,
disarmament and non - proliferation have significance in realizing “human
security.”144
Therefore Japan has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the
Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, and the Restriction on Illegal Transactions of
Small Arms and Light Weapons. In addition, Japan has joined some export control
systems for non-proliferation such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the System of the UN
Register of Conventional Arms, the Wassenaar Arrangement for the prevention of certain
conventional weapons and technologies, the Australia Group for the prevention of
biochemical weapon proliferation, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the
Proliferation Security Initiative.145
US-Japan Security Arrangement
In September 1997, the Japanese and the US governments agreed upon the
Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. This is the second such guideline to
144

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. 4th ed. 8.

145

Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2008. 312.

58

concretize the purpose of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the
United States and Japan, and deals with the international situation after the Cold War.
The aim of the guideline is to strengthen “more effective and credible Japan-US
cooperation under normal conditions, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in
situations in areas surrounding Japan” than the 1978 Guideline.146 In accordance with this
guideline, Japan has to prepare for situations in areas surrounding Japan as follows:
1) The concept, situations in areas surrounding Japan, is not geographic, but
situational.
2) The two governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing
further deterioration of situations.
3) Cooperative activities initiated by either government are
a. Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees
b. Search and rescue,
c. Noncombatant evacuation operations
d. Activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions
4) Japan’s supports for US forces activities are
a. Use of facilities
b. Rear area support
5) The JSDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance,
to protect lives and property and ensure navigational safety. US forces will
conduct operations to restore the peace and security.
In 1999, the Japanese government enacted the Law Concerning Measures to
Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and in
2001 it enacted the Ship Inspection Operations Law to embody and help implement the
new Guidelines. These agreements and laws have strengthened the bilateral defense
relationship. Importantly, the JSDF has acquired a legal basis for approved actions in
situations in areas surrounding Japan.
In accordance with Article 6 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japan provides
bases for US armed forces and the huge Host Nation Support to maintain the US bases.
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As of January 1, 2008, there are 85 areas and facilities for the US Forces Japan, and their
total area is 308.825 square kilometers.147 However 74 percent of US bases in Japan are
concentrated in Okinawa.148 Unfortunately, some serious crimes and accidents have been
caused by US soldiers stationed in Okinawa.149 Therefore, in April 1996, Prime Minister
Hashimoto and President Clinton reconfirmed “their determination to carry out steps to
consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas” in Okinawa.150 In November
1995, Japan and the US established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).
On December 2, 1996, SACO issued its final report to “reduce the burden on the people
of Okinawa and strengthen the Japan-US alliance.” 151 According to the final report, the
US Forces Japan would return 50 square kilometers of bases in Okinawa including the
total lands return of US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station, which was located in the
center of Ginowan city.
Legislation for Responses to Emergency Situations
The Constitution of Japan renounces war. So the Japanese people thought that it
was not necessary to consider emergency situations and responses to them. However at
the turn of this century, Japan faced threats of North Korean missiles and agent ships,
terrorist activities such as the September 11 attack, and international instability such as
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the Afghanistan War and the Second Gulf War. In 2003, politicians started to discuss the
necessity of passing legislation in order to better respond to emergency situations within
the limitations of the Constitution. On June 6, 2003, the National Diet enacted the Armed
Attack Situation Response Law to ensure national independence and security as well as
to ensure the safety of the people in times of emergency. The law stipulates the basic
principles, the basic policies, the procedures and the responsibilities of national and local
governments when an emergency situation occurs. According to the law, the Japanese
government has to obey the following principles: appropriate measures must be taken by
designated public institutions, national and local governments including the JSDF, with
the people’s cooperation; respect must be given for citizens’ freedom and rights as
guaranteed by the Constitution; appropriate information must be provided to the people;
and there must be close cooperation with the US and the UN.152 In accordance with this
law, the government enacted additional emergency legislation such as the Civil
Protection Law and the US Military Actions Law to minimize social damage by armed
attack, to protect civilians, to smooth the JSDF and US armed force actions, and to obey
the international humanitarian laws. These legal frameworks, constructed within
constitutional constraints and proper civil-military relations, were epoch-making events
to strengthen Japan’s security.
Technological Development and Procurement
In June 2001, the JDA issued the Guidelines for Defense Research and
Development. The purpose of the Guidelines is to strengthen the defense technological
and industrial infrastructure, and improve the defense capability of Japan through
152
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appropriate research and development of the JSDF equipment.153 According to the
Guidelines, the following fields should be a priority because these technologies will
definitely affect the outcome of a battle in the future and they are difficult to import from
foreign states: information technology, unmanned vehicle technology, precision guiding
technology, engine technology for jet planes, and avionics technology.
The JSDF was particularly interested in information technology. In December
2000, the JDA published the Outline for Comprehensive Programs by the Defense
Agency and the SDF to Adapt to the Information Technology Revolution (IT Outline)
with the aim of pursuing information superiority and building an organized information
network to conduct smooth operations. There are three elements of the IT outline:
advanced network equipment and systems such as the Defense Information Infrastructure
and the Common Operating Environment, command and control equipment and systems
such as the Central Command System, and the achievement of information security to
protect the JSDF information systems against cyber attacks.154 Through this type of
research and development, the JDA and the JSDF have attempted to conduct a
Revolution in Military Affairs to acquire the capability for network-centric operation.
From 1954 to 2001, the Central Procurement Office (CPO) of the JDA was
responsible for procuring the main equipment (firearms, guided weapons,
telecommunications instruments, ships, aircraft, vehicles, machinery, ammunition, food,
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fuel, textiles, and other necessary materials) as a “central procurement” function.155
Central procurement accounted for a quarter of each year’s defense budget, which was
about 4.93 trillion yen from FY 1996 to FY 2003 on average.156 Central procurement
depended not on competitive contracts but rather on sole source contracts because of
unique weapon specifications and technologies restricted by Japanese laws and patents.157
According to the Japanese Communist Party, 91 percent of the central procurement from
FY 2001 to FY 2006 was based on sole source contracts.158 In addition, because of
Japan’s arms export policy, the defense industry in Japan cannot export weapons to
foreign states. Such a procurement system and arms export policy has caused a rise in
both equipment costs and corruption. The F-2 fighter jet was a multirole fighter jet
developed from the US F-16 Fighting Falcon. The price of the F-2 was 13.2 billion yen in
FY1999.159 The price of the F-16 C/D was 18.8 million dollars in FY1998 (2.27 billion
yen: The exchange rate for trade in January 1999 was 121 yen/dollar).160 The F-2 was six
times as expensive as the F-16 C/D. In 1999, the former director general and the former
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vice-director general of the CPO were arrested for malfeasances such as padded billing of
defense procurement. Because of such procurement problems, the JDA has attempted to
reform the procurement system as follows: strengthen cost accounting capability, create
auditor reporting requirements, clarify a unified policy on padded billing, abolish the
CPO and replace it with a new procurement institution, and institute a check on related
producers by a third party.
The Process of Making NDPG 04
Defense Posture Review Board within the JDA
In response to the situations mentioned above, from September 2001 to December
2004, with the aim of reviewing NDPO 95, the JDA established the Defense Posture
Review Board, which consisted of the minister of state for defense as the chairman, the
senior vice-minister for defense, two parliamentary secretaries for defense, the
administrative vice-minister of defense, the director-general of the secretariat and
directors-general of bureaus as the defense counselors, the chairman of the Joint Staff
Council, and the chiefs of staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. NDPO 95 did not
stipulate a reviewing, but Minister of State for Defense Nakatani ordered a review not
only due to the procurement reform but also for a variety of other reasons: perceived
capability gap, changes in the international situation, development of the US-Japan
security arrangement, legislative discussions about how to respond to emergency
situations, advances in military technology, Japan’s huge fiscal debt, and Japan’s
demographic challenges occasioned by low birth rates. The board, however, did not adopt
a whole governmental effort toward national security. Instead, the board focused on the
future defense posture to be executed by the JDA and the JSDF and finally offered
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opinions on dealing with estimated future situations as follows: responses to new threats
and diverse situations, preparations to deal with a full-scale invasion which threatens the
existence of Japan, and proactive efforts to improve the international security
environment. These future defense postures offered by the board were eventually adopted
as one part of a “Future defense force” of NDPG 04.
Cabinet Approval “Preparation of a Ballistic Missile Defense System”
In December 2003, at a cabinet meeting, the Koizumi administration approved the
preparation of a ballistic missile defense system, decided to equip an MD system, and
agreed to review NDPO 95 by the end of 2004, on the Defense Posture Review Board’s
advice.161 There were four topics in this approval.
First, because there was a high technical possibility of the establishment of a
successful MD system, based on many test results, Japan recognized it as an absolute
defensive requirement to protect the Japanese people and their property. Second, due to
this decision to introduce an MD system and in light of the international situation at the
time, it was necessary to review Japan’s defense capability. Japan’s future defense
capability was to include the following: a joint operations staff to support the defense
minister, reorganized and streamlined major JSDF units, improved functions,
organizations and equipment to support activities that contribute to international peace
and security, and new post Cold War capabilities to respond to new threats. Third,
although the MD system and future defense capabilities required much money, the
government had to reduce overall defense costs because of Japan’s huge fiscal deficit.
Therefore, the government attempted to improve defense efficiency and stay within the
161
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total defense budget limitation in a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of 2004.
Fourth, in order to develop a new Mid-Term Defense Program that included the MD
system and future defense capabilities, the government would develop a new NDPG.162
Liberal Democratic Party’s Proposal
The dominant political party in Japan is the LDP. Established in 1955, the LDP
has led administrations for more than 40 years except for three years (1993 to 1996).163
This party is “a liberal political party that advocates democracy and basic human rights,”
so it is generally regarded as a conservative and pro-US party in the Japanese political
context.164 On November 9, 2003, just before the approval of NDPG 04, a general
election took place in which the LDP and its allies, the New Komeito Party and the New
Conservative Party, received 57.3% of the 480 seats in the House of Representatives.165
Therefore the LDP under President Koizumi’s leadership thought it had a mandate to
review NDPO 95 without any of the opposition parties (the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ), the Japanese Communist Party, and the Social Democratic Party).
The LDP has strong policy planning and implementation capability because it
possesses effective internal administrative organs. The information research bureau was
established under the secretary-general of the LDP, who assists the president in carrying
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out party affairs. In addition, in order to strengthen and unify its organizational activities,
the LDP established a party organization headquarters and some interest group policy
divisions including the Committee on Organizations Involved with National Security.
Many Japanese entrepreneurs of large enterprises support the LDP and its
security/defense policy. Therefore the LDP can gather enough information to build a
national security/defense policy.166 Diet members of the LDP have to belong to the Policy
Research Council for the purpose of studying, researching and planning LDP policies.
The Policy Research Council has separate divisions including the National Defense
Division and its related research commissions and special committees.167 This National
Defense Division sometimes announces security/defense proposals.168
On March 30, 2004, the Subcommittee on Defense Policy in the National Defense
Division of the LDP Policy Research Council announced “the Proposal: Japan’s New
Defense Policy.” The proposal recommended 13 security/defense policies: change Article
9 of the Japanese Constitution to possess military force, execute a collective self-defense
right, transition from the JSA to the ministry of defense, establish the National Defense
Basic Law, strengthen governmental crisis management capability, complete legislation
to respond to emergency situations, establish the International Cooperation Basic Law,
reorganize and strengthen the SDF Act, change NDPO 95, strengthen the US-Japan
security arrangement, strengthen support capability to the minister of state for defense,
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strengthen intelligence capability, and change the Three Principles of Arms Export.169 In
particular, related to NDPO 95, the LDP proposed reviewing the Basic Defense Force
Concept to deal with new threats, expanding the role of Japan’s defense capability to both
Japan’s national defense and international cooperation, strengthening joint operation
capability, legislating support for the MD system, and discussing capabilities to attack an
enemy’s base. On March 12, 2003, members of this committee conducted a hearing to
preview the discussion of the JDA’s Defense Posture Review Board.170 Actually, the
Defense Posture Review Board and the Special Committee on Defense Policies
exchanged information on each other’s issues.
Council on Security and Defense Capabilities
Because of the preparation of a ballistic missile defense system, Prime Minister
Koizumi established the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities inside his prime
minister’s office from April to October 2004 to discuss future national security and
defense from a wide field of view. He appointed Hiroshi Araki, advisor of Tokyo Electric
Power Company, as the chairman, and Fujio Cho, president of Toyota Motor Corporation,
as the deputy chairman. This council consisted of 10 members including the chair and the
deputy chair, and had 13 meetings.

169

Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Proposal: Japan's new defense policy (Chiyoda, Tokyo:
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 2004), 13-16.
170

Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, "Hearing of the Defense Posture Review Board's
discussions," News, March 12, 2003, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/daily/03_03/12/150312a.shtml (accessed
April 10, 2009).

68

Table 1. Discussions at the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities171
1
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th

Date
April 27, 2004
May 18, 2004
June 1, 2004
June 15, 2004
June 29, 2004
July 13, 2004
July 27, 2004
August 31, 2004

9th

September 6, 2004

st

th

10
11th
12th
13th

September 15, 2004
September 17, 2004
September 30, 2004
October 4, 2004

Topic
Administrative issues, Framework of Japan’s security policy
Security issues, Threats to Japan
Responses to threats
US-Japan Security Arrangement, International peace cooperation
Security environment and initiatives in Asia-Pacific region
Present condition and issues of the JSDF
Free discussion on topics
Japan’s future defense force
Governmental security policy making process and interagency
cooperation
Arrangement of arguing points
Arrangement of arguing points
Collation of arguing points
Submission of the report to the Prime Minister

In October 2004 the council finally announced and submitted the Council on
Security and Defense Capabilities Report – Japan’s Visions for Future Security and
Defense Capabilities –to Premier Koizumi. In this report, the council pointed out that in a
new NDPG it was important to express not only the future defense posture but also a new
security strategy.
During the détente period and after the end of the Cold War, it (NDPO 95) served
to enhance people’s understanding of the purpose and dimensions of Japan’s
defense force. However, public attention tended to focus on the number of force
units and equipment listed in its attached table and how quickly the designated
force level was achieved, rather than its substance. Taking into consideration the
changes in security environment since 1995, the Council on Security and Defense
Capabilities has examined what kind of issues that the new NDPO should address.
As this report has indicated, the new NDPO should spell out measures that Japan
has to take to implement the Integrated Security Strategy as well as the roles that
the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has to play and the functions and structure that the
SDF must assume in the future.172
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Therefore the council’s opinion covered broad topics related to security and
defense which should be contained in a new NDPG. In 1957, the Japanese government
had established the Basic Policy for National Defense. This was actually not a basic
defense policy but a basic security policy. And in NDPO 95, the government mentioned
the security policy in a few sentences. The Basic Policy for National Defense and NDPO
95 presented only an idea of national security. The council’s report recommended to the
government that a new NDPG should express a Japanese security policy that is clear and
concrete. This was an epoch-making event for Japan’s security. This council, led by
excellent entrepreneurs, encouraged the government to reform Japan’s security and
defense capability completely, as follows: “The government has to painstakingly
prioritize different requirements and streamline organizations and weapon systems like
the private enterprises did and are still doing, and do so under the political leadership that
will make the entire process accountable to the Japanese citizens.”173
Based on the international situations after NDPO 95, the report presented two
goals of an integrated security strategy Japan should possess: defense of Japan and
prevention of the emergence of threats by improving the international security
environment. To achieve these goals, the council recommended three approaches: Japan’s
own efforts, cooperation with an alliance partner, and cooperation with the international
community.174 In addition, the council mentioned some policy measures to support these
approaches: building a flexible multi-functional defense force, strengthening intelligence
capabilities, substantially reinforcing security council functions, maintaining and
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strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, developing the infrastructure for international
peace cooperation, streamlining the defense industry, reviewing the Three Principles on
Arms Export, and enhancing the efficiency of procurement and R&D. In particular, the
report stressed, “Only an integrated system can ensure security. It is necessary to
eliminate the baneful effects of stove-piped organizational structures and develop a
mechanism that allows swift and effective decision-making.”175
Discussion at Security Council
From October to December 2004, 6 Security Council meetings were held to
develop a conclusion. The members were Premier Koizumi, as a chair, Chief Cabinet
Secretary Hosoda, Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Aso, Minister of
Finance Tanigaki, Minister for Foreign Affairs Machimura, Minister of Economy, Trade
and Industry Nakagawa, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Kitagawa, Minister of State for Defense Ono, and Chairman of the National Public Safety
Commission Murata. All members except Kitagawa, who was a New Komeito Party
representative, were Diet members of the LDP. At this stage, tough political and
interagency negotiations between the LDP and the New Komeito Party, and the ministry
of finance and the JDA were held.
Political Negotiations
The LDP’s mate, the New Komeito Party, is a religion-based party. The New
Komeito Party admitted the fact as follows: “the Soka Gakkai (the Buddhist organization)

175

Ibid., 14.

71

is a constituency that has provided electoral endorsement to the party until today.”176
According to the official Soka Gakkai webpage, 8.27 million households in Japan support
the Soka Gakkai.177 Therefore the New Komeito Party and its ally the LDP can
potentially organize support from millions of members. This relationship between politics
and religion is very controversial, but the New Komeito Party is the third largest party in
Japan next to the DPJ, and the strong alliance between the LDP and the New Komeito
Party has helped sustain administrations since 1999.
The Soka Gakkai’s philosophy is based on Buddhism: “This Buddhist practice
leads to empowerment and inner transformation or "human revolution" which enables
individuals to take responsibility for their lives and contribute to building a world where
people of diverse cultures and faiths can live in peace.”178 So the New Komeito Party’s
security/defense policy is based on pacifism. Therefore even though the LDP wants to
“normalize” Japan’s security policy, it is hard to do so with the New Komeito Party.
On April 20, 2004, to review NDPO 95, the New Komeito Party established the
Review Committee on Defense Posture in the 21st Century. 179 On October 31, 2004, the
New Komeito Party National Convention announced its declaration reflecting the
committee’s arguments. In the declaration, the New Komeito Party decided to maintain
Section 1 and 2 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and examine whether to add
176
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Section 3 to specify what the JSDF could do. This stipulation would allow international
peace cooperation as a primary mission of the JSDF, because the New Komeito Party
recognized such proactive efforts to improve the international security environment were
very important. 180 At the same time, the New Komeito Party proposed to not abandon
the Three Principles of Arms Export but rather to relax MD-related weapons exports.181
The New Komeito Party also strongly opposed offensive capabilities and demanded that
the JDA abandon a research plan for a long-range precision guided ground attack missile
in the Mid-Term Defense Program from FY 2005 to FY 2009.182
These defense policies were a little bit different from the LDP’s, but the LDP
could not ignore the New Komeito Party’s opinion. NDPG 04 did not contain differences
between the two parties’ defense policies such as discussion about attack capability on an
enemy’s base and complete reviewing the Three Principles of Arms Export.
As governmental parties, the LDP and the New Komeito Party have a conference
of responsible persons of policy to negotiate and agree on a common policy. Because of
this conference, the LDP and the New Komeito Party do not express different policies
and opinions during the National Diet deliberations and at other governmental meetings.
Interagency Fiscal Negotiations
The budget is very important in limiting policy. Therefore policy making is very
close to the budgetary process. Because the cabinet approval of the preparation of a
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ballistic missile system stipulated that “a new Mid-Term Defense Program will determine
the limit of the total amount,” the battle between the ministry of finance and the JDA was
tense during the development of NDPG 04.183
I have to mention the annual budgetary process, because it affects and is affected
by the budgetary process of the Mid-Term Defense Program and the NDPG. Japan’s FY
starts on April 1, and the annual defense budget process starts 14 months before this, the
February of the previous FY. First, bureaus of the JDA (MOD) and the JSDF staff offices
make annual operation and budget plans from February to June. Second, they submit
their budget plans to the JDA administration bureau (at present the MOD bureau of
finance & equipment) in June or July. 184 In July or August, the Council on Economic and
Fiscal Policy (CEFP), which is a consultative organ placed within the Cabinet Office and
chaired by the prime minister, presents the budget overview, which clarifies estimated
annual expenditures and budget allocation to priority areas, and the Guidelines for the FY
budget requests.185 Third, based on these two documents, the Administration Bureau
adjusts budgetary requests within the JDA and submits the JDA’s budget request to the
Ministry of Finance Budget Bureau by the end of August. For example, the JDA
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requested 4.96 trillion yen as the FY 2005 budget request.186 Fourth, from September to
December, the ministry of finance budget bureau balances the JDA budget request with
the Guidelines, other ministries budget requests and the administration’s prior budgets.
Then this budget bureau cuts the request, because the JDA request usually exceeds the
Guideline’s request. Fifth, negotiations between the ministry of finance and each ministry
and the JDA are held to restore deleted items from requests to budgets in the end of
December. Sixth, after negotiations, the Cabinet approves the next FY’s budget bill made
by the ministry of finance without amendment, submits it to the House of Representatives
first, and tries to pass it there by the end of February. The FY 2005 total governmental
budget bill (expenditure) was 82.18 trillion yen and the FY 2005 defense budget bill was
4.86 trillion yen.187 The bill is sent to the House of Councilor next. If the House of
Councilor passes it, the bill will be enacted. If the Upper House rejects it, the decision of
the Lower House will be the decision of the Diet, and the bill will be enacted. 188 The FY
2005 Budget Bill passed the Diet as drafted. Through every budgetary process,
nemawashi (“root-binding”) Japanese-style semi-formal prior consultations are held to
minimize budget cuts among bureaucrats and politicians. The governmental budget bills
are usually passed by the National Diet without amendment, so the interagency
186
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negotiation between the ministry of finance and the JDA is the most important.
According to the Debt Management Report 2004, the amount of the Japanese government
debt including government bonds, financing bills and borrowings totaled 703 trillion
yen.189 This budget process helps explain why Japanese government debt reached 165.5%
of the GDP as of FY 2004.190 Japan’s fiscal crisis was the worst among the G8 states.
Therefore the Koizumi administration decided to reform expenditures, and restricted the
issuance of government bonds as much as possible. The CEFP under Koizumi’s
leadership drew up the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and
Structural Reform 2004, and the Cabinet approved it on June 4, 2004.191 Based on the
basic policies, the Japanese government attempted to ensure that the ratio of general
government expenditures to the GDP in FY 2005 and FY 2006 did not exceed the FY
2002 level. And the government aimed to achieve a surplus in the primary balance of the
central and local governments combined in the early 2010’s by continuing the same level
of effort as before to improve the fiscal balance. He also planned to boldly cut expenses,
even obligatory expenses, and restrain total government personnel expenses. Related to
the defense budget, the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and
Structural Reform 2004 said, “The government attempts to develop the JSDF posture to
deal with new threats effectively, and review/improve the JSDF organization and
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equipment efficiency radically.”192 Premier Koizumi stated at the MSDF Fleet Review on
October 26, 2003, “We cannot leave the defense budget reform in the hands of the
uniforms and have to halve their budget request.”193
There are 11 budget examiners in the budget bureau to make the budget bill. Each
examiner is in charge of each policy area’s budget planning. At the time of planning the
new NDPG, the defense budget examiner was Ms. Katayama. She was proud of her job
as a final guardian of civilian control.194 Because of the administration’s budgetary policy,
she attempted to minimize the five-year defense budget of the new Mid-Term Defense
Program and simultaneously cut the FY 2005 defense budget which was the first annual
budget of a new Mid-Term Defense Program, and so faced strong JDA opposition.
First, the JDA wanted to increase the defense budget to equip the MD system and
maintain the minimum defense level, even though Japan faced a fiscal crisis, because the
total MD system’s cost would be 1.0 trillion yen for eight years.195 Therefore on October
21, 2004, the JDA decided to informally request 25.5 trillion yen as a new Mid-Term
Defense Program budget which was 0.49 trillion yen above the then current Mid-Term

192

Ibid., 27.

193

The Yomiuri Shimbun, “Present danger and the new NDPG,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, March 16,
2004,
http://plus.yomiuri.co.jp/article/words/%E7%AC%AC%EF%BC%92%E9%83%A8%E3%83%BB%E3%8
1%9D%E3%81%93%E3%81%AB%E3%81%82%E3%82%8B%E8%84%85%E5%A8%81%EF%BC%88
%EF%BC%98%EF%BC%89%E6%96%B0%E9%98%B2%E8%A1%9B%E5%A4%A7%E7%B6%B1
(accessed April 13, 2009).
194

Satsuki Katayama, "Necessity of JSDF's structural reform." Central Review (ChuokoronShinsha), no. 120-1 (January 2005): 156.
195

Ministry of Finance, Fiscal System Council, Fiscal Reform Subcommittee, "Fiscal Reform
Subcommittee's minutes," Fiscal System Council, December 27, 2004,
http://www.mof.go.jp/singikai/zaiseseido/gijiroku/zaiseia/zaiseia161227.htm (accessed April 13, 2009).

77

Defense Program budget of 25.01 trillion yen.196 Second, in order to deal with infiltrated
guerillas and commandos, the JDA needed to increase the number GSDF authorized
personnel from 160,000 to 162,000.197
However, Ms. Katayama attempted to restrain the new Mid-Term Defense
Program budget to within 24.0 trillion yen.198 In addition, in October 2004, she decided to
cut personnel numbers from 160,000 GSDF troops to 140,000.199
There was a huge difference between the ministry of finance and the JDA. Both
sides leaked their information to the media and utilized their connections with LDP Diet
members to achieve their goals. On December 8, after tough negotiations among both
sides’ bureaucrats and politicians, Minister of Finance Tanigaki and Minister of State for
Defense Ono agreed that the limit of the total amount of defense budget of the new MidTerm Defense Program would be 24.24 trillion yen and the total authorized personnel of
the GSDF would be 155,000.200
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On December 9, 2004, the LDP and the New Komeito Party approved the draft of
NDPG 04 and the Mid-Term Defense Program FY 2005- FY 2009.201 And then, on
December 10, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet approved them officially.
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Chapter 3: The Reason to Rewrite the NDPG
In this chapter, I would like to examine the reason to rewrite NDPG 04. There are
some differences between the NDPO 95 period situations and the NDPG 04 period
situations. The main purpose of this chapter is to show which factors impacted Japan’s
security/defense environment in the NDPG 04 period. And then we can understand that
the NDPG 04 system cannot deal with diversified threats and prevent them from reaching
Japan. You will realize clearly that not only the international situations but also the
domestic political environment are the motives for rewriting NDPG 04.
On January 8, 2009, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura announced, “NDPG 04
stipulated that the government would review it in the end of this year. The Japanese
government thinks it necessary to investigate Japan’s future security and defense posture
synthetically at this best moment.”202 Actually, NDPG 04 said, “These National Defense
Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense force for the next decade.
However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international
situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security
environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.”203 It is not
necessary to change it completely, but the Japanese government is attempting not to
modify NDPG 04, but to create a new NDPG.
In the past, Japan had two NDPOs: NDPO 76 and NDPO 95. The interval
between NDPO 76 and 95 was 19 years. The interval between NDPO 95 and NDPG 04
was 9 years. If the government makes a new NDPG, the interval between NDPG 04 and
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it will be 5 years. Actually, the intervals have been gradually becoming shorter. However
the NDPG is one of the most important basic principles of Japan’s security policy. So it is
not easy to change it. Why did the Japanese government decide to renew the important
NDPG? According to sentences in the NDPG, we must suppose that Japan is confronted
with difficulties in the international society. However is the reason to renew it only based
on such difficulties? We have to examine the international and domestic situations after
the approval of NDPG 04 to know the true reason.
The Process of Making NDPG 09
There is no additional official document such as the Preparation of Ballistic
Missile Defense System to make the government review NDPG 04, there is only the
NDPG 04 stipulation itself. It is instead the political atmosphere that has led to reviewing
it. The interval between the approval of NDPG 04 and its reviewing is only five years.
Therefore the government cannot afford to accumulate discussions. Now MOD’s Defense
Posture Review Board, LDP’s Subcommittee on Defense Policy, and the Cabinet’s
Council on Security and Defense Capabilities are reviewing the NDPG simultaneously. 204
The MOD the LDP, and the Cabinet had to deal with the MOD Reform in 2008 because
of the MOD/JSDF scandals I will mention later. Therefore active discussions on
reviewing were started this January.
Discussions at the MOD are not active. On the other hand, discussions at the LDP
and the Cabinet are very active. In my opinion, the MOD concentrates on providing
enough information to policy makers. In addition, the LDP and the Cabinet are sharing
204
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topics well. Both discussions invite many witnesses from not only the MOD but also the
ministry of foreign affairs, and other governmental organizations. In particular the LDP is
dealing with broad topics related to security and defense policy. I sense that the LDP has
an enthusiastic desire to improve Japan’s security/defense strategy.

Table 2. Discussions at MOD’s new Defense Posture Review Board 205
Date
September 17, 2008
January 9, 2009
February 24, 2009

1st
2nd
3rd

Topic
Administrative issues
Evaluation of the NDPG 04
International security environment

Table 3. Discussions at LDP’s Subcommittee on Defense Policy 206
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

Date
January 22, 2009
January 28, 2009
January 29, 2009
February 4, 2009

5th

February 12, 2009

6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th

February 18, 2009
February 29, 2009
February 26, 2009
March 3, 2009
March 5, 2009
March 12, 2009
March 19, 2009
March 26, 2009
April 2, 2009
April 10, 2009
April 16, 2009

Topic
Administrative issues, Evaluation of the NDPG 04
US national security policy and Obama’s Asia policy
International security environment
Japan’s security strategy, Role of defense force
Obama’s diplomacy and security policy,
US-Japan Security Arrangement
Collective self-defense right
Japan’s contribution to the international society
Issues of JSDF joint operation
MD system
ASDF issues
MSDF issues
GSDF issues
Defense technology and industry
Space development for national security and MD system
Intelligence and National Security Council
JSDF stationing and its relationship with local governments
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Table 4. Discussions at Cabinet’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities207
Date
January 9, 2009
January 26, 2009
February 12, 2009
February 24, 2009
March 3, 2009
March 26, 2009
April 9, 2009

st

1
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th

Topic
Administrative issues, opinion exchange
International security environment
Issues and responses of the international society
Intelligence and decision making
US-Japan Security Arrangements and PKOs
Defense technology and industry
JSDF stationing and its relationship with local governments

Politically, there is one big difference between the NDPG 04 reviewing and the
NDPO 95 reviewing. It is that the governmental parties are not in the majority in the
Upper House. On September 11, 2005, the 44th general election for the Lower House
seats was held. As a result, the LDP and the New Komeito Party have 334 seats of the
480 seats as of April 7, 2009.208 However governmental parties lost the Upper House
election to the Opposition on July 29, 2007. So the LDP and the New Komeito Party only
have 103 seats of the 242 seats as of April 22, 2009.209 The House of Representatives is
superior to the House of Councilors in some points.210 Now governmental parties can
207
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manage their administration somehow because they are an absolutely safe majority in the
Lower House. If they lose the next general election and not become an absolutely safe
majority, it will be very difficult to stabilize Japanese politics. Anyway, not the
Opposition but governmental parties are enthusiastic to review NDPG 04.
Nongovernmental parties have not yet discussed its reviewing and may not do so.
International Situations
Now the new Council on Security and Defense Capabilities is discussing Japan’s
future security and defense policy again. On January 26 and February 12, 2009, the
Council discussed the international situations which affected Japan’s security after the
approval of NDPG 04.211 So we can know what Japan regards as security issues and
threats to Japan through the Council’s discussions.212 In the discussions, the Council
considered the following topics: situations of neighboring states, international terrorism,
pirate activities on Japanese SLOC, major disasters, climate change and its effects, WMD
proliferation, and the space development race. I will also consider these issues in addition
to the financial crisis after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2007,
and the international pandemic.
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Neighboring States
China
China’s GDP in 2007 was 25.73 trillion yuan.213 This means it became the third
largest economy in the world.214 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tries to expand its
power, in order to ensure “the protection of national sovereignty, security, territorial
integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the
Chinese people.”215 The MOD showed its concerns over Chinese dubious military
intentions.
The current military modernization efforts are believed to be undertakings that
will thoroughly improve the military’s capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not
show a clear, specific future vision. From this perspective, there is concern about
how China’s military strength will impact the regional situation and Japanese
security which is to be carefully analyzed.216
For example, China plans to build aircraft carriers. When Minister of Defense
Hamada visited National Defense Minister Liang on March 23, 2009 in Beijing, Liang
officially stated China’s intention to possess aircraft carriers as follows: “Among the big
nations, only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft
carrier forever… China’s navy is currently rather weak. We need to develop an aircraft
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carrier.”217 According to Chinese Major General Zhang, “Even when the navy has its
aircraft carriers one day, our national defense strategy will remain purely defensive,”
Chinese military expansion is no threat to others. 218 However there is no doubt that
Chinese naval expansion will affect Japanese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC),
which is the same as the oil road extending from the Persian Gulf to the Japanese
Islands.219
In addition, the PLA has provoked the JSDF. For example, on November 10,
2004, just before the approval of NDPG 04, a submerged Han-class nuclear submarine
illegally entered Japanese territorial water near Ishigakijima Island of Okinawa
Prefecture.220 According to Article 20 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) which Japan and China had already ratified, “In the territorial sea,
submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to
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show their flag.”221 It is necessary for submarines to know the sea bed terrain well, as
they pass a small strait near Ishigaki Island when submerging.
This submarine incident is strongly related to the PLAN’s strategy. In 2004, the
Chinese government conducted at least 34 oceanographic researches within a 200
nautical mile (NM) circle of Okinotorishima Island, located between Okinawa and Guam
in the Pacific Ocean, without the approval of the Japanese government.222 On April 22,
2004, China claimed the Japanese Okinotorishima Island was an islet and did not have an
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) stipulated by the UNCLOS. 223 According to the
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UNCLOS, rocks do not have the EEZ. China said that, as it was a rock, marine research
from 12NM to 200NM off Okinotorishima was a sovereign right for China.224 The
Japanese government applied to the UN that Japan had established the EEZ around
Okinotorishima Island in 1997. Seven years after this application was made by Japan to
the UN, China started to oppose Japan’s EEZ around Okinotorishima Island. The
Okinotorishima Island area has huge sea bed resources such as cobalt-rich crusts.225 If
Japan loses EEZ right around Okinitorishima Island, it will be a big economic loss. On
February 18, 2005, Press Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chiba answered a
question about the Japanese governmental opinion on this issue as follows:
A question was asked earlier today concerning Okinotorishima. The island, under
the Tokyo Municipal Government, has been known as an island under Japanese
jurisdiction since 1931, long before the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea came into existence. Having ratified the Convention in 1996, Japan
registered its domestic laws concerning its territorial waters, in which
Okinotorishima is included as an island, to the Secretary-General of the UN in
1997. Seven years passed without a single claim. As recently as in 2004, a
research vessel of a certain country, having violated Japan's Exclusive Economic
(b) the method and means to be used, including name, tonnage, type and class of vessels and a
description of scientific equipment;
(c) the precise geographical areas in which the project is to be conducted;
(d) the expected date of first appearance and final departure of the research vessels, or deployment
of the equipment and its removal, as appropriate;
(e) the name of the sponsoring institution, its director, and the person in charge of the project; and
(f) the extent to which it is considered that the coastal State should be able to participate or to be
represented in the project.
224
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Zone (EEZ) by ignoring necessary procedures, was asked why it took the liberty
to do so. It justified its trespassing on grounds that they construed Okinotorishima
as a rock. Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
defines that "an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide." This is exactly what Okinotorishima is. In the
same Article, there is a paragraph stating that "rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no EEZ or continental shelf."
This paragraph talks about a rock which is inhabitable and does not define what
an island is. The definition of an island is spelled out in Paragraph 1, and there is
no room for lay interpretation and this does not serve as a pretext for arbitrary
intrusion. Vessels of a single country have been repeatedly trespassing, 18 times
in the Pacific and as often as nine times around Okinotorishima alone, by defining
the nature of foreign soil at their discretion.226
Why did China research this area without Japan’s approval? If it wants to get
oceanographic data, it should get Japan’s approval to do research or get oceanographic
data from Japan peacefully. But China did not do so, because it wanted to secretly use the
data for submarine warfare.
Okinotorishima, located at a latitude of 20 degree 20’ north and a longitude of
136 degree 05’ east, or roughly 1,100 miles (1,700km) south of Tokyo, is situated
midway between Taiwan and Guam. The American fleet could well pass the area
en route from Guam in the event of military engagement in the Taiwan straits. In
such a case, the PRC would wish to exercise naval, including submarine, control
of the area. For this purpose, the PRC Navy would require a seabed map for use
by its submarines in the area.227
According to Singaporean scholar Ji, the PLAN is trying to establish a layered
defense: coastal line defense and sea denial.
Sea denial constitutes the second layer of maritime defense for the PLAN, which
is in addition to the first layer of coastal line defense needed for sea control. In
other words, sea denial, whether in defense or offence, provides the outer shield
for China’s coastal cities and maritime security. Geographically, this shield is
largely within the first island chain which the PLAN regards as crucial for it to
secure its vital interests…There are two island chains which the PLAN regards as
226
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traditional U.S. ocean barriers for the containment of China. The first chain
begins in Japan, passes through the Liuqu (Ryukyu) Islands to Taiwan, and then
to the Philippines; and is the vanguard of a discernible threat to the PRC. The
second chain stretches from Japan’s Ogasawara-gunto Islands through to the Ioretto Islands, and from there to the Mariana Islands.228
According to government sources in Tokyo, a Han-class submarine left Qingdao
Naval base in mid-October 2004, passed the Nansei Islands between Okinawa Island and
Miyakojima Island, into the Pacific in late October, reached and circled Guam in early
November, and then on November 10, covertly attempted to pass through Japanese
territorial water to go back to Qingdao. 229 But it was chased by MSDF destroyers and
patrol aircrafts. I suppose, as a Japanese submariner, that it aimed to learn the capability
of the Japanese anti-submarine patrol system, practice covertly passing the first island
chain, collect area navigational data, and check on US military bases in Guam. For this
operation, oceanographic research data around Okinotorishima Island was well utilized.
Not only Okinotorishima Island but also the East China Sea is an arena of dispute.
China claims that its EEZ in the East China Sea extends from its coast to the Okinawa
Trough. On the other hand, Japan claims its EEZ from its coast to the median line
between each country's coasts.230 In addition, China started to drill for oil and gas near
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the median line, and took a firm attitude to dispatch combatant ships to protect its oil/gas
rig as follows:
China has embarked on exploration and drilling of oil and gas fields as well as
building facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and
South China Sea. This includes the building of drilling facilities in the oil and gas
field, whose geographical structure runs to the eastern side of the intermediate
line between Japan and China. It is believed that naval vessels’ operation near the
drilling facilities in September 2005 aimed to flaunt the capabilities to acquire,
maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests.231
Both governments attempted to solve the issue peacefully with “a win-win
deal.”232 On June 18, 2008, Japan and China agreed to the joint gas development projects
in the East China Sea.233 However there is still a huge difference between both sides’
opinions. Japanese Foreign Minister Koumura said, “It is in fact correct that there are
several oil and gas fields that have been the focus of issues until now, but regarding
Shirakaba, although the development that will take place is on the Chinese side of the
median line that Japan claims, given the straw effect, there is the possibility that some of
the reserves on the Japanese side are also being taken out and that was the largest
problem. We decided to solve that largest problem and also I would like everyone to
understand that we have separately stipulated a new joint development region which will
be a new symbol of that as a "Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship.”234 On June 24,
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2004, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang said, “On the East China sea delimitation, China
has never and will not recognize the so-called "median line" as advocated by Japan.
China upholds the principle of natural prolongation to solve the delimitation issue of East
China Sea continental shelf.”235
Not only naval/maritime issues but also other issues caused by China distressed
the Japanese government. For example, in 2005, ASDF fighters had to scramble against
about 110 PLA planes which had entered the Japanese ADIZ.236 The number was the
same as the number of scrambles against Russia. Japan’s ADIZ borders on the Northern
Territories, which are administrated by Russia and whose sovereignty is claimed by
Japan. However, the Japanese ADIZ border in the East China Sea is far from the Chinese
coast line. The number of scrambles against China in 2005 was a surprising figure.
On March 14, 2005, the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress
enacted the Anti-Secession Law. In accordance with this law, China justified the military
option to prevent Taiwan’s “independence”. Article 8 says as follows:
Article 8. In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should
act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from
China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should
occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely
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exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary
measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.237
The Japanese governmental stance is, “the issue surrounding Taiwan will be
resolved peacefully by direct dialogue between the parties concerned on the Taiwan
Straits, and the Japanese government cannot support any unilateral attempt by either side
to change the status quo.”238 Therefore the government seriously worried that the law
would have a bad influence upon international security in East Asia.
On June 15, 2001, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). According to the SCO, its
objectives are “strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations among
the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy,
science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism,
environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure
peace, security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new,
democratic, just and rational political and economic international order.”239 In spite of
what it says, some analysts such as Tannock of the Guardian regard the SCO as a
counter-balance against US-led security systems, “There is little doubt that the SCO is an
instrument for Russia and China to make the case for a multi-polar world based on
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regional security blocs that counterbalance American strategic hegemony.”240 In August
2005, China and Russia had a joint exercise “Peace Mission 2005” in the Shandong
Peninsula, China.
"Peace Mission 2005", the first joint military exercise launched yesterday by
China and Russia, is not the innocent peacekeeping drill its name suggests. It
represents a significant deepening of the military relationship between a former
superpower and an emerging one, and therefore will be closely watched by the
only current superpower, the US…If these war games were really about
peacekeeping, they would not require the mock amphibious assaults, attack
submarines and Russian long-range strategic bombers that military analysts say
are involved. Xinhua, the Chinese news agency, said the exercises would help
strengthen the capability for joint strikes against "international terrorism,
extremism and separatism". The use of the word "separatism" suggests that one
Chinese aim is to train for an invasion of Taiwan, the island seen in Beijing as a
renegade province, or at least to demonstrate that China is serious about enforcing
its claim.241
Because of Chinese military expansion and its strong military relationship with
Russia, the MOD analyzed, “the military balance between China and Taiwan is changing
to the advantage of China.” 242
However Japan attempts to strengthen its military relationship with China to
know each other and to deal with common threats. On November 28, 2007, Japan
welcomed the Chinese destroyer Shenzhen to Tokyo.243 On June 24, 2008, China
welcomed to Zhanjiang the Japanese destroyer Sazanami that was loaded with “blankets,
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medical supplies and other relief goods” for victims of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.244
These visits were the first time after the Second World War that each state had sent a
naval vessel to the other. Both states are dispatching fleets to escort merchant vessels to
the Gulf of Aden, and they have agreed to information sharing in anti-piracy
operations.245
North Korea
The international society has attempted to compel North Korea to abandon
WMDs, but it has not yet abandoned them. On the contrary, on July 5, 2006, it tested
ballistic missile launching as a “part of the routine military exercises staged by the
Korean People’s Army to increase the nation's military capacity for self-defense”.246 On
July 15, 2006, UNSCR 1695, condemned “the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic
missiles on 5 July 2006,” demanded, “the DPRK suspend all activities related to its
ballistic missile program, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to
a moratorium on missile launching”, and urged “ the DPRK to return immediately to the
Six-Party Talks without precondition, to work towards the expeditious implementation of
19 September 2005 Joint Statement, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs, and to return at an early date to the Treaty on NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency

244

The USA TODAY, "Japanese navy destroyer arrives in China," The USA TODAY, June 24,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-06-24-3623207016_x.htm (accessed April 18, 2009).
245

Xiaohuo Cui, "China, Japan OK sharing info to combat piracy," The China Daily, March 21,
2009, http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/21/content_7602630.htm (accessed April 18, 2009).
246

Korean Central News Agency, “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Its Missile Launches,”
Korean Central News Agency, July 7, 2006, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed April 16, 2009).

95

safeguards.”247 Even though North Korea was a member state of the UN, it ignored
UNSCR 1695 and conducted an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006.248 UNSCR
1718, on October 14, 2006, demanded North Korean not conduct any other nuclear tests
or ballistic missile launches, and decided “the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to
its ballistic missile programme and in this context re-establish its pre-existing
commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.”249
However, the international society’s wish was not fulfilled. On April 5, 2009,
North Korea launched the “Unha-2” rocket to send what it claimed was the satellite
“Kwangmyongsong-2” into orbit.250 It flew over the Tohoku district of Japan, and the
Japanese people became frightened. I know that every state, even North Korea, has the
right to launch satellites, but North Korea has not attempted to clear up doubts on its
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles development programs, which do not contribute to
world peace. So it was very difficult for the international society to believe that the
launch was a satellite launch and not a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile launch. Therefore,
on April 13, the UNSC announced the Statement by the President of the Security Council,
2009, stating that “The Security Council condemns the 5 April 2009 (local time) launch
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by the DPRK, which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006).”251
The launch, which was a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile which can reach Alaska, failed,
and “no object entered orbit,” according to the North American Aerospace Defense
Command.252
The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 has been completely outlived.
As shown by these North Korean actions, it is clear that North Korea possesses enough
ballistic missile technology to attack Japan.253 According to the International Crisis
Group, reporting on March 31, 2009, there is high possibility that North Korea already
possesses 320 Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles and a “Nodong missile can
already carry a nuclear warhead as far as Tokyo.”254 Even if Japan develops its MD
system, it would be very difficult to shoot all of them down. The reality as it exists now is
that not Taepodong-2 but Nodongs are serious threats to Japan’s security, and there is
low possibility that the threats will be lightened in the future.

251

United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Security Council," United
Nations Security Council, April 13, 2009.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/301/03/PDF/N0930103.pdf?OpenElement (accessed April
16, 2009).
252
International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks of Overreaction,” Asia
Briefing No. 91 (March 2009): 1-2; and North American Aerospace Defense Command, "NORAD and
USNORTHCOM monitor North Korean launch," NORAD News, April 5, 2009,
http://www.norad.mil/News/2009/040509.html (accessed April 16, 2009). The International Crisis Group
said, “The Taepodong-2 could possibly reach Alaska… North Korea was preparing to put the
“Kwangmyongsong -2”, an experimental communications satellite, into orbit with the Unha-2 space launch
vehicle, more commonly known as the Taepodong-2 missile.”
253

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration." According to the JapanDPRK Pyongyang Declaration, “Both sides confirmed that, for an overall resolution of the nuclear issues
on the Korean Peninsula, they would comply with all related international agreements. Both sides also
confirmed the necessity of resolving security problems including nuclear and missile issues by promoting
dialogues among countries concerned. The DPRK side expressed its intention that, pursuant to the spirit of
this Declaration, it would further maintain the moratorium on missile launching in and after 2003.”
254

International Crisis Group. “North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks of Overreaction” 1.

97

Russia
Because of the dramatic rise in oil prices and former president Putin’s strong
leadership, Russian society has recovered from the stagnation caused by the fall of the
Soviet Union. The armed forces of the Russian Federation have also recovered, and it is
trying to modernize its troops. Japan faces its lively military activities again. On August
17, 2007, then President Putin announced that Russia had resumed cold-war-style longrange flights of strategic bombers.255 The ASDF has to deal with Russian “Tokyo
Expresses” again.
Russian military operations seem to be increasingly more active in the vicinity of
Japan, including exercises and training, in association with the recovery of troop
skill levels… In July 2007, Tu-95MS Bears flew near Guam, and on February 9,
2008, Tu-95MS Bears entered into Japanese territorial airspace (above Sofugan
Island in the southern Izu Islands).256
Other International Factors
International terrorism
The MOD regards international terrorism as follows: “The activities of non-state
actors, including international terrorist organizations, present a serious threat. Acts of
terrorism are occurring in every region of the world.” 257 For example, in November 2008,
terrorists, who were 10 Pakistani nationals belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba, attacked
Mumbai, India, and killed about 164 people.258 Fortunately, terrorist incidents have not
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yet occurred since the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 20, 1995 in
Japan. However, if Japan ignores the threat of terrorism as an issue unrelated to it, Japan
will meet with serious terrorism in the future. In particular, the Mumbai incident was
caused by Pakistani terrorists, so Afghanistan and Pakistan are very important areas in
which to prevent the proliferation of terrorism. On March 27, 2009, US President Obama
announced a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and expressed
his recognition that Afghanistan and Pakistan are keys to securing the international
society.
Al Qaeda and its allies -- the terrorists who planned and supported the 9/11
attacks -- are in Pakistan and Afghanistan… The future of Afghanistan is
inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan… Terrorist attacks in
London and Bali were tied to al Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, as were attacks in
North Africa and the Middle East, in Islamabad and in Kabul. If there is a major
attack on an Asian, European, or African city, it, too, is likely to have ties to al
Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan. The safety of people around the world is at
stake.259
In January 2002, Japan hosted the first International Conference on
Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (Tokyo Conference), and it has donated 1.46
billion US dollars to the financial assistance of Afghanistan and it has sent 140 experts
for development assistance.260 In addition, on April 17, 2009, Japan hosted the Pakistan
Donors Conference and Friends of Democratic Pakistan Group Ministerial Meeting in
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Tokyo, and finalized a 5 billion US dollars assistance plan for the next two years.261 The
MSDF is still dispatching its fleet replenishment tankers to the Indian Ocean to support
the MIO. The global war on terror is also a long war for Japan.
Pirate activities on Japanese SLOC
Ninety-eight percent of Japanese trade depends on maritime transportation.262
Ninety-nine point eight percent of oil consumed in Japan is imported from other states,
and Japan imports 90 percent of oil from the Middle East. 263 The Japanese oil road is
drawn from the Middle East to Japan, but recently pirates have attacked Japanese ships
on oil SLOC, especially in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean. For example, on April 21,
2008, the Japanese oil tanker Takayama was shot at by Somali pirates in the Gulf of
Aden. No one was injured, but the pirates made a hole in the stern.264 The German frigate
Emden and its helicopter fended off the pirates, so the Takayama could run away from
the pirate’s attack.265 Because of this incident, the Japanese government attempted to
protect SLOC and merchant vessels from pirates’ attacks. First, Japan became a
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cosponsor of UNSCR 1816 to “deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” and
approved subsequent UNSCRs as a nonpermanent member of the UNSC.266 Second, in
March 2009, based on the governmental interpretation of the SDF Act, the MSDF sent
two destroyers to the Gulf of Aden to protect vessels related to Japan.267 Third, the
government is planning to send two P-3C patrol aircrafts to the area this May, and it
plans to pass the anti-piracy bill in this session of the National Diet, to protect any other
nationalities’ vessels.268
Japan has contributed to the building of an anti-piracy mechanism in East Asia for
a long time. Pirates have attacked merchant vessels not only in the Gulf of Aden but also
in the Strait of Malacca. Compared with Somalia, coastal states of the Malacca Strait
have enough capabilities to maintain maritime public order. Under the Koizumi
administration’s strong leadership, Japan promoted international collaboration through
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which was enacted on September 4, 2006.269 On November 29,
2006, ReCAAP member states established an information sharing center in Singapore.270
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The JCG has sent some staff members to the information sharing center.271 In 2006, the
Japanese government also provided a grant aid to Indonesia so it could build three patrol
vessels.272 Such maritime police efforts are very effective in East Asia. However,
according to Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Kaneko, speaking
at the Special Committee on anti-piracy and anti-terrorism, the House of Representative,
on April 15, 2009, it is very difficult for the JCG to deal with pirates in the Gulf of Aden
because of the distance from Japan, the weapons possessed by pirates, and the
international naval coalition in the area.273 So Japan should change the way it deals with
pirates, depending on the situation. Maintenance of maritime public order is important,
not only for the Japanese economy, but also for world trade.
Major Disasters, Climate Change and Its Effects
On December 26, 2004, the second largest earthquake after 1900, next to the
Chilean earthquake of 1960, occurred off the west coast of Northern Sumatra, and caused
huge tsunamis to hit the Indian Rim.274 The quake was 9.1 on the Richter scale. Not less
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than 225,000 were killed.275 More than 220,000 Indonesians were killed or missing as of
January 2005, “95,000 and 100,000 bodies had now been found and buried in Aceh and
northern Sumatra,” in particular.276 Because of Thai and Indonesian governmental
disaster relief requests, the Japanese government dispatched joint JSDF units including 1
C-130H, 5 vessels, 10 helicopters, 2 air-cushioned landing crafts, to around northern
Sumatra from December 2004 to March 2005.277 This was the first joint international
disaster relief mission for the JSDF. A magnitude 7.9 earthquake hit Sichuan province,
China on May 12, 2008.278 Casualties of the earthquake There were more than 70,000
casualties of the earthquake.279 In response to a Chinese governmental disaster relief
request, the Japanese government dispatched the Japan Disaster Relief Rescue Team and
the Japan Disaster Relief Medical Team in May 2008.280 The Japanese government has
had to deal not only with international disasters but also with domestic disasters such as
the magnitude 6.9 Noto Peninsula earthquake in 2007, which killed one person; the
magnitude 6.8 Chuetsu offshore earthquake in 2007, which killed 15 people; the
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magnitude 7.2 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku earthquake in 2008, which killed 13 people; the
tremendous snowfall of 2005-2006, which killed 152 people; the torrential rain in July
2006, which killed 25 people; and the torrential rain in the end of August 2008, which
killed 3 people. 281 The JSDF conducted disaster relief operations at all the domestic
disasters I mentioned above.
Recently, global warming has been causing some disasters and climate change.
For example, increasing the temperature of the sea surface gives hurricanes, typhoons and
cyclones such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 more power: “More-frequent hurricanes are
part of most global warming models, and as mean temperatures rise worldwide, it’s hard
not to make a connection between the two.”282 In addition, sea level rise caused by
climate change erodes the coasts of islands, and some island-states such as Tuvalu will
disappear in the near future, meaning that residents will have to find someplace else to
live, as Tuvalu Deputy Premier Tavau Teii said: “If the time comes we should leave the
islands, there is no other choice but to leave."283 Natural disasters related to global
warming and climate change are serious threats to the international society. The more
serious disasters become, the more difficult it is for each state to deal with them by itself.
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WMD proliferation
Not only North Korea but also Iran attempts to possess nuclear weapons, even
though they are ratified states of the NPT. They also have ballistic missiles to carry them.
Every state has a right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination,” and has to explain that its nuclear program is
not related to a military nuclear dimension.284 However both states have not yet fulfilled
their duty. On February 19, 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
reported Iran’s present nuclear project as follows:
The Agency has verified that, as of 17 November 2008, 9956 kg of UF6 had been
fed into the cascades since February 2007, and a total of 839 kg of low enriched
UF6 had been produced. The results also showed that the enrichment level of this
low enriched UF6 product verified by the Agency was 3.49% U-235. Iran has
estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 January 2009, it produced an
additional 171 kg of low enriched UF6… Iran has not suspended its enrichment
related activities or its work on heavy water-related projects, including the
construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, IR-40, and the
production of fuel for that reactor.285
Japan has maintained friendly diplomatic relations with Iran for 80 years. Even so,
“Mr. Nakasone pointed out the seriousness of the five United Nations Security Council
Resolutions and the importance of continuous cooperation with IAEA. He also stated that
Iran should take its own steps, including the suspension of enrichment-related activities,
in order to win the trust of the international community,” because Iran’s nuclear issue
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threatens the international non-proliferation efforts.286 Japan froze properties related to
Iran’s nuclear projects. 287 In order to strengthen Japan’s nuclear non-proliferation efforts,
the Japanese government made Ambassador Amano run as a candidate for the director
general-ship of the IAEA on April 7, 2009.288
Japan pays close attention, not only to nuclear proliferation, but also to biochemical weapon proliferation. Japan has sent some staffs of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Hague since 1997, and in August 2004 it sent
Major General Akiyama there as the director of the inspectorate division.289 On February
14 and 15, 2006, Japan hosted the Biological Weapons Convention Tokyo Seminar to
support the preparation for the 6th Review Conference of the Biological Weapons
Convention which would be held in November 2006.290 The review conferences are held
once every five years, but ratified states could not agree on the final declaration at the 5th
conference. Therefore, through the Tokyo seminar, Japan promoted international
286
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collaboration to reach a final declaration at the 6th conference. Finally, the 6th Review
Convention announced the final declaration and decided to establish the Implementation
Support Unit within the Geneva branch of the United Nations Department for
Disarmament Affairs.291
Space Development Race
After its first manned space craft Shenzhou 5 was launched on October 15, 2003,
China continuously launched manned space crafts in October 2005 and September 2008
based on the Shenzhou program. The final purpose of the Shenzhou project is to “build a
permanent space laboratory and a space engineering system.” 292 In addition, China is
strongly promoting the Chinese lunar exploration program, and on October 24, 2007, it
launched the Chang'e 1 spacecraft to explore the Moon. The Chang'e project consists of
three parts: orbiting the moon, landing on the moon, and returning samples from the
moon.293 Therefore the next step is to land a lunar rover on the Moon softly, and to
research its surface automatically. On January 11, 2007, China tested its anti-satellite
system to destroy an old weather satellite, and Japanese Prime Minister Abe expressed
his concern about China’s misuse of space.294
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India also has a lunar exploration program. The first Indian lunar orbiter,
Chandrayaan 1, was launched on October 22, 2008 to “prepare a three-dimensional atlas
of the Moon and conduct chemical and mineralogical mapping of the entire lunar
surface.”295 Chandrayaan 2 will be launched in 2012 to send a lander to research the lunar
surface.296
Most space projects are peaceful, but these technologies are strongly related to
military ones. Japan has to develop its space project to maintain some technological space
superiority and get into the future market related to space development, because of rivals’
projects.
The Financial Crisis
Depressions have caused many wars in the world’s history. For example, the
Great Depression after 1929 divided the world into bloc economies, and finally caused
the Second World War. Depression sometimes invites nationalism and economic
protectionism to slumping states. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the present financial crisis resembles the Great Depression in some points as follows:
The current downturn is highly synchronized and is associated with a deep
financial crisis, a rare combination in the postwar period. Accordingly, the
downturn is likely to be unusually severe, and the recovery is expected to be
sluggish. It is not surprising, therefore, that many commentators looking for
historical parallels for the current episode focus on the Great Depression of the
1930s, by far the deepest and longest recession in the history of most advanced
economies…An important common feature is that the U.S. economy is the
epicenter of both crises. Given its weight, a downturn in the United
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States has all but guaranteed a global impact. This sets the current crisis and the
Great Depression apart from many other financial crises, which have typically
occurred in smaller economies and had more limited global impact.297
On January 28, 2009, Prime Minister Aso said at the Diet, “The current financial
crisis is said to be a once-in-a-century occurrence.”298 In this current once-in-a-century
depression, along with G20 members, Japan is attempting to stabilize the international
society in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the tragedy which occurred after the Great
Depression. For this purpose it is attempting to:
1)
2)
3)
4)

restore confidence, growth, and jobs;
repair the financial system to restore lending;
strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust;
fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome this crisis
and prevent future ones;
5) promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin
prosperity; and
6) build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery. 299
Japan recognizes that providing economic support to the international society is
the best way to secure Japan. In order to achieve these objectives, Japan, which has a
huge fiscal deficit, has decided to
1) Implement economic stimulus packages at a scale of 75 trillion yen in total
2) Expand Official Development Assistance to Asia: a total amount of 2.0 trillion
yen
3) Additional assistance to trade finance: a total amount of 22 billion US dollars
in 2 years in addition to 90 billion US dollars per annum on average
4) Provide a loan of a maximum of 100 billion US dollars to the IMF
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5) Make efforts towards early agreement on tripling (+200%) the capital of the
Asia Development Bank
6) Establish a fund to recapitalize banks in developing countries
7) Provide assistance to provide liquidity in each region
8) Double Japan's ODA to Africa by 2012
9) Promote investment to future environment
10) Respond to a rise in protectionism
11) Strengthen the financial system in terms of regulation and supervision, and
12) Reform international financial institutions including the IMF, the World
Bank.300
International Pandemic
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from 2002 to 2003, Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread all over the world, especially in Asia, and
killed 774 people. 301 Now we are facing a more serious threat than SARS: Bird flu or
new flu. In the near future, Bird flu will change to human flu and cause a pandemic. The
Inter-ministerial Avian Influenza Committee estimated the casualties in Japan will be as
follows.
Using the upper limit, 25 million, the numbers of moderate and severe cases of
new influenza were estimated, based on the classification of Asian flu etc. as
moderate (fatality: 0.53%), and Spanish flu as severe (fatality: 2%). Based on the
fatality for moderate and severe cases, the upper limits of inpatients and deaths
were estimated 530 thousands and 170 thousands respectively for moderate cases,
while 2 million and 640 thousands for severe cases.302
It is impossible to prevent a new influenza pandemic, so the Japanese government
is attempting to “avoid socioeconomic collapse by preventing the onset of new influenza
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as far as possible through promoting collaboration with domestic animal sanitation
divisions, by containing it at the early stage by public health intervention, as well as by
minimizing the spread of infection and health hazard in pandemic period.”303 In addition,
international collaboration to minimize the damage of a new influenza is very important.
Japan hosted the Japan-WHO Joint Meeting on Early Response to Potential Influenza
Pandemic in December 2006 and has provided 195 million US dollars to support
international anti-flu projects.304 Without appropriate measures, a new flu pandemic will
seriously damage Japanese society and the world.
Many serious diseases such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Ebola
hemorrhagic fever and Marburg hemorrhagic fever are originated from Africa. Therefore
research on these African origin diseases is very important for all human beings. The
Japanese government established the Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize in July 2006 to
support medical study and medical services in Africa.305 Japan hosted the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993, 1998, 2003 and
2008.306 The first Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize ceremony was held in the 4th TICAD.
Both are strongly related to each other. Development aid contributes not only to the
economy but also to public health to prevent serious diseases.

303

Ibid., 4.

304

World Health Organization, "Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1
November 2002 to 31 July 2003.”
305

Cabinet Office, "What is the ‘Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize’?" Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize,
2006, http://www.cao.go.jp/noguchisho/gaiyo-e.html (accessed April 21, 2009).
306

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "What is TICAD?" Regional Affairs, 2009,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/index.html (accessed April 21, 2009).

111

The Domestic Situation
Fiscal Crisis
Japan has a serious financial deficit.
The government debt is expected to reach about 150.4% of GDP in FY2009. As a
whole, Japan’s fiscal situation is one of the most severe among major advanced
countries with a structure that shifts the burden to future generations.307
The Koizumi administration decided, “Under the strained state of public finance,
the Government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and
streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement an efficient defense program, in
line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization.”308
Therefore according to the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and
Structural Reform 2006, the Japanese government is trying to allocate the same amount
for the defense budget for the next five years in spite of providing fiscal support for the
realignment of the US Force Japan and the missile defense project.309
The first stage of the MD system development is almost budgeted; however, the
second stage of development will require new budgeting. The next main fiscal issue
related to the defense budget is the realignment of the US Force Japan. The United
States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation on May 1, 2006 said as follows:
Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their
approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in
a manner that maintains unit integrity... Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the
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facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam,
Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY 2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion
in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to
enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents
that such force relocation be realized rapidly.310
On February 17, 2009 in Tokyo, to materialize the roadmap, Foreign Minister
Nakasone and State Secretary Clinton signed the Agreement between the Government of
Japan and The Government of the United States of America Concerning the
Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their
Dependents from Okinawa to Guam. Now both governments are ratifying it.
Article 1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the
amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars
($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the
United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of
approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000
dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”)
subject to paragraph 1.of Article 9 of this Agreement.311
In accordance with this agreement, from FY 2010 to FY 2014, the Japanese
government will expense 2.8 billion US dollars for direct cash contributions, and will
make a Japan Bank for International Cooperation fund and loan to build housing and
infrastructures for marines in Guam totaling 6.09 billion US dollars.312
The defense budget consists of three categories in classification by expenses:
personnel and food provisions expenses, obligatory outlay expenses “which are paid
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under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years,” and general material expenses.313
The FY 2008 defense budget was 4742.6 billion yen in total. In FY 2008, personnel and
food provisions expenses were 2094.0 billion yen (44.2%), obligatory outlay expenses
were 1722.4 billion yen (36.3%), and general material expenses were 926.2 billion yen
(19.5%).314 Personnel/food provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses are
mandatory expenses, and some general material expenses such as equipment maintenance
cost, education/training cost, and the cost for SACO-related projects are also mandatory
(See Appendix D).315 The discretionary budget is very small. In addition, US Force
realignment-related costs will strain the defense budget. The MOD attempted to budget
for the relocation of III MEF from the defense budget to a special budget, and negotiated
for this with the ministry of finance.316 However 34.6 billion yen was budgeted for the
relocation within the FY 2009 defense budget, because of the Basic Policies for
Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006.317 The JSDF is facing a
serious fiscal crisis similar to that of the Japanese government. Therefore it is required to
modernize and downsize to maintain its capability within a limited and reducing defense
budget.
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Scandals in the MOD and the JSDF and Their Reform
Scandals
In a few years, scandals hit the MOD and the JSDF.
First, the head of the defense plans and program division of the MSDF staff office
provided incorrect information to senior officers, the minister and the chief cabinet
secretary on the amount of fuel provided to the US Navy in the Indian Ocean by MSDF
fleet replenishment tanker Tokiwa. Even though he learned later that the information was
incorrect, he did not report this fact to his seniors. 318 His dereliction was regarded as “a
lack of professionalism and a denial of civilian control” as follows:
1) Work-processing mistakes within the Ministry of Defense, including a report
with inaccurate figures and the failure to correct the report, demonstrated that
the Ministry of Defense failed to appropriately assist the Minister of Defense,
who is a core of civilian control.
2) Responses based on the inaccurate figures were made at the Diet, which
demonstrates that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces will not be
appropriately controlled by the Diet, which is responsible for final civilian
control.
3) At the same time, the fact that inaccurate information was given directly to the
people through press conferences is a grave situation that may cause damage
to the basis of the issue of civilian control.319
Second, “in February 2006, an incident of leakage of classified information on the
destroyer Asayuki from a privately owned personal computer through file-sharing
software came to light.”320 In addition, there were other information leakages. These
incidents were caused by the fact that the JSDF security system could not keep up with
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the information technology revolution and personnel did not have a correct understanding
of classified information.321
Third, “in January 2007 it was discovered that a crew member of the destroyer
Shirane had saved information that was thought to be classified on an external hard disk
at the crew member’s home, and as a result of investigations, in December 2007, an
MSDF officer was arrested on suspicion of leaking special defense secrets concerning the
Aegis system, and four other MSDF officers were sent to the prosecutor.”322 According
to the investigation, no special defense secrets concerning the Aegis system were leaked
to outside the JSDF.323 However if the information had been leaked to outside, this
incident would have impacted the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and other friendly
countries.
Fourth, on November 27, 2007, former vice minister of defense Moriya was
arrested for violating the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act and the Criminal
Code. He was suspected of accepting monetary gifts such as free golfing and offered
special favors for choosing procurement from two defense trading companies, Yamada
Corporation and Nihon Mirise Corporation.324 In addition, it became clear in December
2007 that Yamada Corporation billed the MOD excessively for two pieces of imported

321

Ibid., 371.

322

Ibid., 371.

323

Ibid., 371.

324

The Japan Times, "Fukuda, Machimura, Nukaga rue Moriya's bribery arrest," The Japan Times,
November 29, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20071129b3.html (accessed April 21, 2009).

116

equipment.325 So the Japanese people had a strong doubt of procurement system of the
MOD.
Fifth, on February 19, 2008, MSDF Aegis destroyer Atago collided with the
fishing boat Seitokumaru near the Bousou peninsula, Chiba Prefecture. Because of this
collision, two fishermen were lost. According to the Yokohama Regional Marine
Accident Tribunal, the Atago’s failure to prevent the collision with the Seitokumaru
crossing the Atago’s wake from right to left was caused mainly by the Atago’s neglect in
watching, and secondarily because the Seitokumaru did not sound warning signals and
conduct corporative action to avoid a collision.326 In addition, it took 1.5 hours to report
this accident to the minister of defense and 2 hours to report it to the prime minister.327
The MOD and the JSDF were criticized that it should have taken less time to report this
accident. Because of this accident, the Japanese people worried about governmental crisis
management capability and MSDF seamanship.
Reform of the MOD and the JSDF
These incidents made the government decide to reform the MOD and the JSDF.
The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was established by the prime
minister’s office.
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Table 5. Discussions at the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense328
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th

Date
December 3, 2007
December 17, 2007
January 9, 2008
February 1, 2008
February 13, 2008

6th

March 3, 2008

7th

April 7, 2008

8th
9th
10th
11th

May 8, 2008
May 21, 2008
June 19, 2008
July 15, 2008

Topic
General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF
Ensuring civilian control
Establishing a rigorous information security system
Ensuring civilian control
Ensuring civilian control
1) Issues related to the system of communicating information following the
incident involving the Aegis-equipped destroyer Atago
2) Points of previous discussions
In the Project Team for Promoting Comprehensive Acquisition Reform
Report (Defense Ministry Report)
Points of previous discussions
Studying the ideal structure and organization of the Ministry of Defense
General rearrangement of the points of previous discussions
Finalizing of the “Report”

The Council announced the Report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of
Defense on July 15, 2008. In this report, the Council pointed out how to reform the MOD
and the JSDF as follows:
Reform Proposal 1: Reform of the Consciousness of Personnel and
Organizational Culture
1) Principles of Reform
The Reform Council, based on consideration and analysis of the incidents of
misconduct proposes the following principles for reform: (A)Thorough
adherence to rules and regulations, (B)Establishment of professionalism
(professional awareness), and (C) Establishment of a management of works
that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization.
2) Thorough Adherence to Rules and Regulations
It is necessary to ensure that awareness of adherence to the rules and
regulations prevails in an organizational climate. In addition, it is necessary to
organize these rules in a manner that clarifies what needs to be observed.
3) Establishment of Professionalism (Professional Awareness)
Senior personnel with thorough professionalism should take leadership to
instill a high degree of ethics and a sense of mission throughout the entire
organization.
4) Establishment of a Management of Works that Prioritizes Execution of
Duties, with the Aim of Total Optimization
In addition to reform of the consciousness of individual personnel and units, it
is necessary to create an organizational culture that aims at total optimization
of the organization, focusing on the execution of duties.
Reform Proposal 2: Organizational Reforms for Modern Civilian Control
1) Necessity of Organizational Reform
328
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In order that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces can implement
the above-mentioned three principles of reform steadily and effectively,
organizational reform is required.
2) Strategic Level: Strengthening Command Functions of the Prime Minister’s
Office
The Reform Council proposes that the Prime Minister’s Office should utilize
the Security Council and other ministerial councils to strengthen the command
functions by actively and comprehensively discussing the critical items for
security.
3) Organizational Reform to Strengthen Command Functions at the Ministry of
Defense
The Reform Council proposes that while maintaining the current organization
of the Ministry of Defense basically through drastic reforms and restructuring
of the various functions and responsibilities, a structure should be created so
as to prevent recurrence of incidents of misconduct, enable civilian control to
function, and enable the implementation of more effective defense policies329
In addition to the Council, the MOD established the ministry of defense reform
promotion team in February 2008 to review itself.330 After the announcement of the
report, the MOD changed the team to the ministry of defense reform head office to
materialize reform proposals recommended by the Council.331
In FY 2008, the MOD conducted the following measures:
Thorough adherence to rules and regulations
1) Senior personnel understand the necessity of rules and regulations and take the
initiative in obeying them
2) Workplace training for staff members on regulations focused more on necessity
than formality
3) Thorough enforcement of rules and regulations related to preservation of
classified information and strict disciplinary action for violation
4) Clarification of responsibilities for securing transparency in defense
procurement, as well as preparing and releasing records of meetings
5) Strengthening inspection and observation including inspections without notice
6) Revision and examination of necessities of rules and regulations
Establishment of professionalism
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1) Review of educational programs and administrative experience in order to
foster staff members with broad views
2) Expanding basic workplace education, while reviewing the balance of
workload and workforce within each section of the SDF, as well as reducing
excessive workload in the workplace
3) Development of professionalism involving information communication and
security, which is significant to the present security
Establishment of a management of works that prioritizes execution of duties,
with the aim of total optimization
1) Establishment of cooperation structure based on a sense of unity between
civilian and uniformed staff, and between the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF
2) Establishment of voluntary PDCA (Plan – Do – Check – Act) cycle
3) While taking into account the “Best Practices” of the private sector, common
efforts for improvement should be made by subordinates and commanders who
lead an SDF unit, the basic unit to the Ministry of Defense
4) Mobile response to issues related to the policy plan by the Integrated Project
Team (IPT) method
5) Full-scale introduction of IPT method in defense procurement
6) Further promotion of joint operations posture centered on the Joint Staff
7) In order to maintain the trust of the Japanese people, implementation of various
press conferences and integrated public relations activities by units and central
organizations332
In FY 2009, the MOD budgeted two main measures for the second stage reform
as follows:
1) Abolish the Support System by Civilian Defense Counselors and appoint
Aides to the Minister of Defense to Expansion of Policy Decision-Making
System which centers on the Minister of Defense.
2) Explicitly establish the Defense Council by law, and advise the Minister of
Defense on policy decision-making and responses to emergency situations
through deliberation by politicians such as the Senior Vice-Minister and
Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, and civilian officials such as the ViceMinister of Defense, and uniformed officials such as the Chief of Staff,
JSO.333
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In FY 2010, the MOD attempts to reform itself as the third stage based on the new
NDPG as follows:
1) In order to reinforce the Bureau of Defense Policy functionally, attempt to
improve the system of planning, drafting and implementing defense policies.
Also, plan functional reinforcement that takes the actual situation into account
in terms of operation by appointing SDF personnel. In particular, work to
improve intelligence-analysis capabilities, and drafting projects such as
international peace cooperation activities.
2) In order to reinforce Joint Staff Office functionally, abolish Bureau of
Operational Policy and ensure the execution of operations under the Chief of
Staff, Joint Staff, who receives orders from the Minister. Concerning
important matters such as unit mobilization and operational planning, submit
the matter for approval to the Minister of Defense, after obtaining suggestions
from the Defense Council through the Bureau of Defense Policy.
3) In order to ensure optimization of defense capability build-up, arrange and
realign the defense capabilities build-up sections of the Internal Bureau and
the three Staff Offices of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF. Then establish a
defense capability build-up department that unitarily engages in build-up
projects, and study how the department should specifically be. Concerning
important matters, the defense capability build-up department of the Ministry
of Defense will prepare options, gain approval by the Minister of Defense via
the Internal Bureau through discussion at the Defense Conference.
4) In order to strengthen personnel divisions, actively appoint SDF personnel
familiar with the actual conditions of the unit while aiming at utmost
integration. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF Staff Offices will bear
responsibility for issues related to personnel, education and training of the
SDF. However, the internal Bureau will assist the Minister of Defense in
terms of system and policies.334
The LDP also attempted to reform the MOD. The LDP established the
Subcommittee for Reforming the Ministry of Defense in the Research Commission on
Security of the LDP Policy Research Council on March 19, 2008, and this met for
discussions 11 times. At last, the subcommittee announced “the Proposal: Reform of the
Defense Ministry” on April 24, 2008.
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Table 6. Discussions at LDP’s Subcommittee for Reforming the Ministry of Defense 335
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th

Date
March 19, 2008
March 26, 2008
March 27, 2008
April 2, 2008
April 3, 2008
April 8, 2008
April 10, 2008
April 16, 2008
April 17, 2008
April 23, 2008
April 24, 2008

Topic
General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF
General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF
General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the MOD and the SDF
Past scandals and measures
Assistance systems for Defense Minister in other states
SDF Act and MOD Establishment Law
General rearrangement of the points of previous discussions
Points of previous discussions
Points of previous discussions
Making of the draft
Finalizing of the “Report”

In the Proposal, the LDP required the Japanese government to reform not only the
MOD but also the governmental security system itself as follows:
1) National security and crisis management
a. Establishment of the National Security Council
b. Increasing the staff of the Cabinet Secretariat for security and crisis
management
c. Establishment of the Premier Adjutant
d. More minister-level simulation exercises for security and crisis
management
2) Civilian Control and structure of the MOD
a. Abolition of the Civilian Defense Counselors and Establishment of the
Aides to the Defense Minister
b. Reinforcement of the Joint Staff Office and abolition of the Bureau of
Operational Policy
c. Establishment of the permanent joint operation headquarter
d. Establishment of the MOD Information Gathering and Operation
Center
e. Establishment of the Defense Council by law
f. Utilization uniforms to explain the defense policy at the Diet
g. Mixing civilians and uniforms in the internal Bureaus of the MOD
3) Morale-building Measures
a. Improvement of the rate of capacity utilization
b. Improvement of salary and allowance system
c. Appointment of Chief of Staff, Joint Staff by the Emperor’s attestation
d. Improvement of training and education system
e. Improvement of Public Relations
f. Improvement of mental health consultation system336
335
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However the proposal emphasized that the most important policy to reform the
MOD was an amendment of the Japanese Constitution to stipulate the JSDF and establish
a court-martial system.337 In this point, the LDP’s proposal is completely different from
the Council’s report.
According to Defense Minister Hamada, “former ASDF Chief of Staff Tamogami
expressed his views in a paper which deviates from the Government's position
represented by the statement of August 15, 1995 by then Prime Minister Murayama.”338
He fired General Tamogami on December 3, 2008 because he regarded Tamogami’s
expression as a violation of the civilian control concept.339
Politicians and taxpayers wanted to reform them completely. These scandals have
exerted enough pressures to cause NDPG 04 to be re-written completely.
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Security Arguments in Japan
After NDPG 04, governmental politicians have argued about Japan’s security
more than ever before, and have tried to strengthen the legal background of the Japanese
security system, which had been trivialized by the Constitution of Japan. In order to
contribute to the international society as the second largest economic power, Japan has to
join more PKOs, strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and maximize the JSDF’s capability
within the political limitation set by the Constitution.340 In line with this policy,
governmental parties composed of the LDP and the New Komeito Party have legislated
for strengthening the legal basis of the Japanese security system.
Transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense
On December 15, 2006, the Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency
Establishment Law and Other Related Laws was passed by the National Diet, and on
January 9, 2007 the JDA was changed to the MOD.341Before then, the JDA was one of
the extra-ministerial bureaus, “agencies,” of the Cabinet Office, which was a ministry of
the Cabinet and whose minister in charge was the prime minister. The actual head of the
JDA was the minister of state for defense, but organizationally the minister in charge of
national defense was the Premier. This structure was not effective, for the following
reasons:
1) Only the head of the ministry can request to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet
meetings for enactment and amendment of laws and ministry ordnances,
making decisions on implementation of important activities of the JSDF. The
Minister of State for Defense was a member of Cabinet meetings, but could
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not do so because he was not the head of his ministry. So it was hard for the
JDA to respond diverse emergency situations immediately.
2) This agency status potentially invited misunderstandings by other parties
during defense talks, international dialogue and the JSDF activities conducted
overseas in cooperation with other countries because the JDA may not have
been deemed an administrative organ equivalent to those in charge of national
defense in other countries.342
At the same time, the SDF Act was amended, and the government added
international peace cooperation operations such as international disaster relief operations,
activities in situations in areas surrounding Japan, and fleet replenishment activities in the
Indian Ocean to the first priority mission of the JSDF, “defense of Japan against direct
and indirect invasions.”343
The amendment was passed not only by governmental parties, but also by the
Opposition, and by more than 90 % of the members of the National Diet.344 Fifty-two
years have passed since the JDA was established. Sixty-one years after the Second World
War the Japanese people recognize the importance of the MOD/JSDF and that “we have
to share not only costs but also risks to stabilize the international society” even though
the pacific Constitution still exists.345
Japan-Australia/India Security Declaration
On March 1, 2007, in Tokyo, Prime Minister Abe and Australian Premier Howard
announced the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. This
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declaration was quite historical, because Japan has not made such a security relationship
with any other state except the US. Both states agreed on mutual security cooperation
based on “their respective alliance relationships with the US” in the following areas:
1) Law enforcement on combating transnational crime, including trafficking in
illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking,
counterfeiting currency and arms smuggling;
2) Border security;
3) Counter-terrorism;
4) Disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their means of delivery;
5) Peace operations;
6) Exchange of strategic assessments and related information;
7) Maritime and aviation security;
8) Humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief;
9) Contingency planning, including for pandemics346
This declaration was based on common recognition of a need for a preventive
defense policy, that is “the future security and prosperity of both Japan and Australia is
linked to the secure future of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.”347 The JapanAustralian security relationship is strengthened by efforts such as cooperation between
GSDF troops and the Australian Army in Iraq and East Timor, and the Japan-Australia
Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations.348
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On October 22, 2008, in Tokyo, Prime Minister Aso and Indian Premier Singh
announced the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Both
states agreed mutual cooperation within following areas:
1) Information exchange and policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia
Pacific region and on long-term strategic and global issues.
2) Bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia, in particular the
East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ReCAAP processes.
3) Defense dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the Joint
Statement signed in May 2006 between the two Defense Ministries.
4) Cooperation between Coast Guards
5) Safety of transport
6) Fight against terrorism and transnational crimes
7) Sharing of experiences in peacekeeping and peace building
8) Disaster management
9) Disarmament and non-proliferation349
This declaration was based on “their deep respect for each other’s contribution in
promoting peace, stability and development in Asia and beyond.”350 The security
relationship was just started last year, but both are starting some projects such as sending
an MSDF officer to the Indian National Defense College.351
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Why did Japan choose Australia and India as security partners? Both states share
a “common commitment to democracy, open society, human rights and the rule of law”
with Japan.352 And they are regional powers to stabilize areas which are strongly related
to Japan’s interest. They are preventive strategic partners for Japan.
Basic Act on Ocean Policy and Basic Space Law
Because of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy enacted on July 20, 2007, Japan
established the Headquarters for Ocean Policy within the Cabinet to promote interagency collaboration including the MOD to protect Japan’s maritime interest:
The purpose of this Act is…to promote measures with regard to the oceans
comprehensively and systematically, through contributing to the sound
development of the economy and society of our State and to improve the stability
of the lives of citizenry as well as to contribute to the coexistence of the oceans
and mankind…under the international cooperation, as our State surrounded by the
oceans, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other
international agreements as well as on the international efforts on the realization
of the sustainable development and use of the oceans.353
According to the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, the headquarters manages total
maritime policy such as harmonization of the development and use of the sea with the
preservation of the marine environment, securement of the safety and security of the sea,
enhancement of scientific knowledge of the sea, sound development of marine industries,
comprehensive governance of the sea, and international partnership with regard to the
sea.354 Japan is facing some serious maritime issues such as territorial and EEZ disputes,
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pirate threats and international terrorist activities on the sea. By means of international
laws and rules, through international organizations such as the International Court of
Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and through the
international community, the government is attempting to solve these maritime issues and
prevent threats from reaching Japan via the sea.355
Superficially Japan had not been able to utilize space militarily until 2008,
because of the House of Representatives Resolution on Basic Policy for Space
Development and Utilization on May 9, 1969, which stated that Japan’s space
development should be limited to peaceful purposes.356 Under this restriction, the
Japanese government had, at the most, attempted to utilize satellites. For example, the
Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center has operated three information gathering satellites
for reconnaissance. The Basic Space Law enacted on May 28, 2008 allowed Japan to
utilize space militarily. Due to its bitter experience of the North Korean launch in April
2009, the MOD is considering putting an early warning satellite into orbit to detect
boosted ballistic missiles.357 The Strategic Headquarter for Space Development in the
Cabinet is attempting to make a basic plan on space by the end of this May. The plan will
say that electronic intelligence gathering satellites and early warning satellites should be
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immediately possessed to prevent threats from reaching Japan, but the decision should be
made under NDPG 09 and the new Mid-Term Defense Program. 358
Arguing the Establishment of the American style National Security Council
Prime Minister Abe made the Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the
Prime Minister’s Office Regarding National Security in November 2006 within his
Cabinet, and submitted the bill on the Partial Amendment of the Security Council
Establishment Law to the National Diet in April 2007 to establish the NSC of Japan.359
However the bill was shelved and the Council’s final report on February 27, 2009 was
ignored, because Abe’s successor, Fukada, was not interested in the NSC.360 The report
recommended establishing the special advisor of the premier for security and crisis
management in the NSC, composed of the prime minister, the chief Cabinet secretary, the
minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of defense and its secretariat to deliberate on
the basic inter-agency policy on national security and diplomacy, and on the response
policy in emergency situations.361
LDP policy makers knew the importance of NSC’s establishment, so they stated
again the necessity of NSC’s establishment in LDP’s “Proposal: Reform of the Defense
Ministry" in April 2008.362 Because of North Korean missile launch in April 2009, LDP
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policy maker Koike stated at LDP’s Subcommitte on Defense Policy on April 10 that
Japan should immediately establish the NSC to deal with emergencies.363
Act on Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan
Section 1 of Article 96, the Constitution of Japan stipulates, “Amendments to this
Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or
more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people
for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast
thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.”364 However,
amendments had not been made to the Constitution for 60 years. Therefore governmental
parties attempted to materialize the concept of Article 96, and submitted the Bill on
Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan in 2006 to the National Diet.
Even though there was some opposition, especially from the Social Democratic Party, to
any political effort to amend the Constitution, the bill was passed on May 14, 2007.365 It
is still hard to amend the Constitution because the Upper House is occupied by
nongovernmental parties strongly opposing its amendment, but Japan has the legal basis
to amend it in Section 2 of Article 9. This means that Japan has gradually “normalized”
to overcome military antipathy and has accepted the JSDF as an important means of
contributing to international society.
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US-Japan Security Arrangement
The US and Japan have various levels of security policy consultations such as the
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held by the secretary of state and the secretary of
defense, and the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense. The SCC is the
highest consultation of US-Japan security arrangement framework based on letters
exchanged between the Japanese premier and the US secretary of state on January 19,
1960.366 The SCC has announced important joint statements to strengthen the US-Japan
security arrangement. On May 1, 2007, the SCC announced the Joint Statement of the
US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, and made clear their common strategic
objectives as follows:
1) Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party
Talks;
2) Further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international
stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain
consistency between its stated policies and actions;
3) Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum;
4) Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law,
human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in
Southeast Asia;
5) Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States
and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of
security and defense;
6) Continuing to build upon partnerships with India;
7) Ensuring Afghanistan’s successful economic reconstruction and political
stabilization;
8) Contributing to the reconstruction of a unified and democratic Iraq;
9) Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at
bringing Iran into full compliance with its IAEA requirements; and
10) Achieving broader Japan-NATO cooperation.367
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In order to achieve these objectives, following measures were required:
1) The redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international
peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and
responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan;
2) Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the
evolving security environment and to better posture the forces of the two
countries to operate together in a regional crisis;
3) Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security
measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA);
4) Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) Defense Working Group;
5) Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to
coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before
and during crisis situations; and
6) Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability
and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.
Based on these objectives and measures, both governments attempt to strengthen
the US-Japan security arrangement. In addition to efforts based on the present US-Japan
Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, Defense Minister Hamada suggested making a
new joint declaration to State Secretary Clinton this February to develop the arrangement
dramatically.368 Their common concept was to stabilize the international society to
prevent threats from reaching the US and Japan.
Comparison between Japan and Germany
Japan and Germany were Axis states in World War II, and both states’ people
have strong anti-militarism sentiments now because of their “catastrophic defeat.”369
However both states are attempting to enlarge their military roles in the international
368
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society to secure the world, particularly in the post September 11 attack period.
According to Katzenstein, “Compared with Germany, the response of the Japanese
government was less insistent and less fraught with risk.”370 Why?
Because of each geopolitical location and situation in the Cold War era, each state
enacted an original constitution or basic law. Japan, surrounded and protected by the sea
in the Far East, enacted its Constitution in 1947. The Constitution has renounced war and
abandoned a military force. Although the Self Defense Force was established in 1954,
Japan has had no impediment to this for 55 years even without the amendment of the
Constitution because of the constitutional interpretation: the SDF is not a military force.
Therefore the SDF’s role is limited by the constitutional interpretation. And amending the
Constitution is very difficult. On the other hand, Germany, which was divided into East
and West Germany in 1949, was a front line of the Cold War. Germany’s rearmament
was accepted and it joined NATO in 1955, and added the following articles to the Basic
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany:
Article 24
(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of
mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon
its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe
and among the nations of the world.
Article 87 a
(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Their
numerical strength and general organisational structure must be shown in the
budget.
(2) Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent
expressly permitted by this Basic Law.371
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This amendment was only carried by two thirds of the members of the Bundestag
(Federal Diet) and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat (Federal Council). Germany
could possess a military force for its defense. Compared with Japan, Germany could
decide to send its troops overseas because of the stipulation in the Basic Law and the
Federal Constitutional Court’s decision after the end of the Cold War.
On 12 July 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court settles the dispute that was
fought across all political parties over Bundeswehr (Federal Defense Force)
operations abroad. The second senate of Germany’s supreme court under the
presidency of Jutta Limbach dismisses three complaints of unconstitutionality.
The ruling confirms the legitimacy of Bundeswehr operations that were conducted
abroad in accordance with the German Basic Law... On the basis of Article 24,
paragraph 2 of the German Basic Law, this ruling also covers combat missions.
However, each combat mission is subject to the approval of the German
Bundestag on a case-by-case basis.372
Such clear legislative and judicial bases made it easier for Germany to conduct
overseas military cooperation than for Japan, which had to depend on the constitutional
interpretation.
Reasons to Change NDPG 04 Completely
Because of the present globalization, Japan has to recognize that the possibility of
direct invasion has declined and it is difficult for Japan, acting alone, to prevent diverse
international threats from reaching Japan. The best way to minimize diverse international
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threats is to cooperate and stabilize the international society. The answer is preventive
defense through securing the world.
Before the Koizumi administration, Japan had many political limitations such as
lack of legislation for responding to emergency situations and lack of effective schemes
for the US-Japan security arrangement, and the pacific political atmosphere. Because of
Koizumi’s and his successors’ efforts, the Japanese political environment on national
security was dramatically changed, and it became possible to discuss security policy
calmly.
In addition, Japan has to reform the MOD and the JSDF because of their
structural faults and fiscal pressure. Now Japan is facing the necessity of reforming the
security and defense systems, and has nice political conditions. This is the reason why the
Japanese government has decided to rewrite NDPG 04 completely. I suppose that NDPG
04 cannot be adapted to the changes in the international and domestic political
environments any more. The new NDPG has to provide guidelines to reform Japan’s
security system and defense structures in order to secure Japan and the world.
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Chapter 4: The Likely Contents of NDPG 09
In this chapter, I would like to present the likely contents of NDPG 09. We can
estimate them by examining NDPG 04’s deficiencies and the need for its improvement as
discussed in chapter 3. The contents will likely consist of the following parts: security
environment in Japan and the world, a new NSS, a new NDS, a new NMS or defense
review, and an attached table to show the future defense force. Japan cannot by itself
prevent diversified threats from reaching Japan, and international cooperation will be the
best way to secure Japan in the future.
Security Environment
Because of globalization, the world will be multi-polarized and more diversified.
New members of the G20 are getting more economic and military power. In the 21st
century, the US is still the largest power politically, economically, and militarily, but its
superiority will be relatively declined because of multi-polarization. International threats
such as the proliferation of WMDs, terrorism and pirate activities will be more diversified.
For Japan, the rise of China, WMDs of North Korea, and the revival of Russia are major
security issues. In relation to security issues, we must consider three factors. First, the
Japanese government cannot increase its budget related to national security and defense,
in spite of the increasing unit cost of military equipment based on technological
development and the difficulty of recruiting soldiers because of the declining birthrate.
Second, the possibility of direct invasion has declined, and it is difficult for Japan,
working alone, to prevent diverse international threats from reaching Japan. Third, the
US-Japan security arrangement is still vital and a basis for Japan’s national security and
defense, and for stability in East Asia. However, it is impossible for only the ministry of
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foreign affairs, the MOD and the US-Japan security arrangement to protect Japan
anymore. Japan’s security and defense efforts have to be diversified.
New Security and Defense Strategy
Sun Tzu said, “The highest excellence is to subdue the enemy’s army without
fighting at all.” This means that it is effective and inexpensive not to react to crises as
they are occurring but to prevent threats in advance. This Sun Tzu style of crisis
prevention strategy based on international cooperation will be a mainstream in each state
including Japan, because each state alone does not have enough power to prevent diverse
threats. And such a strategy to pursue its interests without fighting is the best way for
pacific Japan, which wants to prevent bloodshed.
NDPG 09 should be not only an NDS, an NMS and a defense review but also a
true NSS to gather together all the governmental security efforts and cooperate with the
international society to achieve the same two objectives as NDPG 04: the prevention of
threats from reaching Japan and the improvement of the international security
environment. Japan has to deepen its security relationship with other states which share a
common political and economic background in such as democracy, the concept of basic
human rights and an open fair market mechanism.
Whole Governmental Security Efforts
Because of the strict budgetary limitation and the diverse international threats, it
is necessary for Japan to review and reform not only the MOD/JSDF but also its oldfashioned security/defense policies such as bureaucratic sectionalism, the Basic Policy
for National Defense, the Three Principles on Arms Export, and the Security Council of
Japan, to secure Japan and the world effectively. Even though some policy makers
138

possessed of high principles are attempting to amend Article 9 of the Constitution, the
framework of NDPG 09 will be based on it. Inter-agency security cooperation such as the
new NSC, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy and the Strategic Headquarters for Space
Development will be more important to fiscally and politically improve governmental
business efficiency. In addition, Japan will attempt to establish national intelligence
gathering and analysis systems to provide information appropriately and immediately to
policy makers.
Japan’s Defense Force
Even though inter-agency effort will be important, the JSDF is “the ultimate
guarantee of Japan’s national security.”373 The MOD and the JSDF now have serious
problems, and their structure should be reformed. The JSDF capability is still based on
the Cold-War style one to deal with an enemy’s invasion, and its capability should be
changed into one oriented to dealing with military operations other than war (MOOTW)
to conduct international cooperation operations. The JSDF must possess more overseas
operation capability. Japan does not have to protect itself from an enemy in its homeland,
it has to prevent crises overseas.
US-Japan Security Arrangement
In East Asia, the Cold War structure still exists between US-Japan-South KoreaTaiwan and Russia-North Korea-China. The existence of the US Force Japan is vitally
important as a balancer to stabilize this area. Japan needs to assist in the US Force
Japan’s realignment and relocation to improve its capability and to reduce the burdens of
local areas where US bases are located, based on the roadmap and the guidelines between
373
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both states. MD cooperation is the key to strengthen this arrangement, and the US and
Japan need to improve its reliability. In order to develop the JSDF overseas operation
capability, US Forces’ support is very helpful. Both forces should deepen their
interoperability more.
International Collaboration
Japan will deepen Japan-Australia/India security relations. There is the possibility
that Japan will strengthen its security relationships with the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and New Zealand, because these states share a common political and economic
background with Japan and they have a strong military relationship with the US near
Japan. Japan will utilize international security frameworks such as the UN, the IAEA,
ReCAAP, and the ASEAN Regional Forum to stabilize the international society. Japan
may increase PKOs in the next NDPG period. Japan’s developmental assistance and its
framework such as the TICAD will be increased because nation building is the best way
to stabilize the area surrounding failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan.
New Military Strategy and Appropriate Force in an Attached Table
The Japanese government will review the fixed defense budget distribution to the
GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF. Their present budget ratio is four-three-three. The
GSDF has an important role of PKOs, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations, and is a final goalkeeper against an enemy’s invasion. However it needs huge
personnel expenses and land warfare equipment, especially an armored division. I
estimate that the new NDPG may try to downsize it and distribute its surplus among the
MSDF and the ASDF. The GSDF units will be made more movable and inexpensive.
There is a high possibility that the MOD will abolish regional armies, change divisions to
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brigades, and establish a state-wide ground defense command. The MSDF and the ASDF
have the capabilities to stop an enemy’s invasion outside of Japan’s homeland. In
addition, it is easier for them to attend international operations. They will be invested in
more than the GSDF. However, a joint operation is a current trend. Therefore these three
armed services will be integrated to establish a permanent joint headquarters, and will be
utilized in the MOOTW as a joint force. The MOD will try to launch more military
satellites such as an early warning satellite to gather information and communicate, but
has to consider the cost-benefit analysis because satellite development requires much
money.374 Because of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, Japan will establish inter-agency
collaboration to protect Japan’s maritime interest. The MSDF may play the key role with
the JCG to support the economic activities of the ministry of economy, trade and industry
to produce actual territorial/EEZ control results. The MD system was almost equipped. In
the period of the new NDPG, the JSDF will try to verse itself in the system. Because of
the vice minister’s procurement corruption, a reform of the procurement system will be
conducted, and the MOD will consider the realignment of the defense industry.
The GSDF will start to procure new main battle tanks (MBTs) to replace Type 74
MBTs in FY 2010.375 Simultaneously, the GSDF and MOD’s Technical Research and
Development Institute (TRDI) are developing a wheeled tank destroyer that looks like an
Italian Centauro or a US Stryker mobil gun system for overseas and anti374
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terrorism/commando operations. Because of fiscal pressure by the ministry of finance, in
2007 the MOD once agreed that the total number of MBTs and wheeled tank destroyers
would be within 600, which was shown as the maximum number of tanks in an attached
table of NDPG 04.376 This meant that the ministry of finance wanted to reduce the
number of expensive MBTs. However, for the GSDF, the MBT is the main equipment
with which to strike an enemy’s armored force; its function cannot be replaced by a
wheeled tank destroyer even if a wheeled tank destroyer armors well. The GSDF will
attempt to budget for wheeled tank destroyers separately from the MBT budget and
maintain NDPG 04’s number of MBTs in the new NDPG discussion.
In addition to building two Hyuga class flattop helicopter destroyers (DDHs) in
this Mid-Term Defense Program, the MSDF plans to build two more flattop DDHs to
replace two Shirane class DDHs in FY2010 and FY 2012.377 These DDHs have
capabilities of well Command/Control/Communications/Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) as flag ships and for transportation much as
the US Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ships. Because of the new DDHs, the MSDF
will improve its overseas operation capability. The MSDF and the TRDI are developing
maritime patrol aircraft XP-1s (Its former name was P-X) to replace the P-3Cs. The
MSDF budgeted for 4 XP-1s in FY 2008.378In the period of the new NDPG, the MSDF
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will promote the replacement of P-3Cs by XP-1s to protect Japan’s maritime interest in
peacetime and to battle against submarines in wartime.
In spite of finishing F-22 production in the US, the new fighter jets will be
selected in the NDPG 09 period to replace F-4EJs which will reach the limit of
endurance.379 The ASDF has to choose new fighter jets from among F-15FX, F/A-18E/F,
F-35 and Eurofighter Typhoons to maintain air superiority in East Asia and defense
industry which has produced Japanese fighters under license or originally.380 The ASDF
and the TRDI are developing transport aircraft C-Xs to replace C-1s. C-X development is
a joint project with XP-1 development.381 Although XP-1 development is going well, C-X
has not yet flown because of structural design error.382 The ASDF wants to procure C-Xs
in the NDPG 09 period to improve its overseas operation capability dramatically.
The total amount of the defense budget in the NDPG 09 period will be smaller
than NDPG 04’s, so the total strength of the JSDF in the attached table will be decreased
slightly. NDPG 09 will provide the vision for Japan’s security and defense policy for the
next, not ten years but five years, so there is high possibility that the next Mid-Term
Defense Program will be assimilated into NDPG 09.
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Furthermore
NDPG 09 will be based on Article 9 of the Constitution and present a
constitutional interpretation. If Japan wants to share not only costs but also risks in
international cooperation to secure the world, discussing the amendment of Article 9 of
the Constitution and accepting an interpretation of the collective self-defense right as the
LDP proposed will be inevitable because it is very difficult to conduct international
operations without coalitional efforts and multilateral military cooperation. In my
estimate, such discussions will be developed in the period of NDPG 09. The principle of
Section 1 of Article 9 is an established pacifism based on the UN Charter and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.383 Therefore the amendment of Section 2 of Article 9 to
stipulate the SDF will be the focus for discussion. Now Japan is attempting to enact an
anti-piracy bill. This will provide the SDF with the authority to protect not only Japanese
citizens but also foreign citizens by using weapons beyond legal defense and defense out
of necessity if the pirates do not obey directions and stop their ships. This will be an
epoch making act to step out of self defense. To protect all people attacked by pirates is
the duty of all states, especially those which are ratified states of the UNCLOS.384 An era
in which Japan is reluctant to share risks in the international society due to Article 9 of
the Constitution and the interpretation of the Constitution will end in the near future.
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Chapter 5: NDPG 09 and the US-Japan Alliance
In this chapter, I would like to mention the ambiguous future of Japan’s political
environment and its influence on the US-Japan security arrangement. There is the
possibility that the next general election, which will be held by this September, will
destabilize Japan’s politics. Whichever party becomes the ruling governmental party, it
will choose a preventive strategy to prevent threats from reaching Japan from overseas
based on the US-Japan security arrangement. However the US-Japan security
arrangement will be felt to be uncomfortable, if the DPJ wins the election.
Now MOD’s Defense Posture Review Board, the LDP’s Subcommittee on
Defense Policy, and the Cabinet’s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities are
simultaneously reviewing and rewriting NDPG 04. Their common understanding is that
the US-Japan alliance is vital for Japan’s security and that it should be strengthened in the
future.
However, Japanese politics has been plunged into chaos. The public approval
rating for the Aso administration is low. It was 24 percent in the end of March, and the
“disapproval rating for the current Cabinet remained high at 56 percent.”385 There is the
possibility that the present ruling governmental parties will lose to the DPJ in the next
general election or find it difficult to maintain an absolute safe majority in the Lower
House. If so, what will happen? Ozawa, the last president of the DPJ, the largest
opposition party, said, “As there is a large element of instability in Southeast Asia, a US
presence is required, but generally speaking, I think the 7th Fleet is sufficient. As the
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scale of the US military presence in Japan decreases, Japan can simply take on
responsibility for national security and defense issues that affect us.”386 This means that
Ozawa intends to minimize the US Forces Japan and substitute the JSDF for it. It may be
that the US-Japan alliance will be changed in quality and quantity. Will Ozawa and his
successor Hatoyama be able to do so?
Although he has said so, it will be difficult for the DPJ to conduct their defense
policy. The DPJ consists of politicians who have various kinds of political ideologies
from the Right to the Left. It has not yet even started to review NDPG 04 in spite of the
possibility it will become the ruling governmental party after the next general election,
because they cannot decide on their security/defense policy. In the end, the DPJ will
agree that a Sun Tzu style crisis preventive strategy based on international cooperation is
the best way to prevent threats in advance. In addition, it is impossible for Japan to
increase the defense budget to substitute the JSDF for the US Force Japan.
If the LDP wins the next general election and maintains an absolute majority in
the House of Representatives, NDPG 09 will be naturally approved this December
according to the plan based on the MOD, the LDP, and the Cabinet Office’s reports. If
the DPJ wins, what will happen? There are two possibilities. First, the DPJ will try to
draft it from their political point of view as a governmental party. However, the DPJ has
not yet argued it, so NDPG 09’s approval will be postponed and NDPG 04 will be used
until the next NDPG. In the end, the DPJ’s NDPG will be similar to the LDP’s NDPG
because using a preventive strategy to secure the world is the most inexpensive, pacific
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and effective way for Japan. Second, the DPJ cannot decide on their defense policy, and
it will approve the draft of NDPG 09 reviewed by the LDP administration. I suppose the
former possibility is higher than the latter, but the approval will come too late. In short,
the DPJ and other opposition parties are less capable of accomplishing policies than the
LDP and the New Komeito Party.
In the end, NDPG 09 will be based on a preventive strategy. However, it is
possible that the DPJ’s Japan and Obama’s US will have an uncomfortable relationship
because of the DPJ’s motley ideology.
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Conclusion
The globalizing international society has been increasingly more diversified and
multi-polarized since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the September 11,
2001 attack in the United States. Threats are now very diverse, and each state cannot deal
with them alone.
Japan is facing international pressures such as the rise of China, North Korean and
worldwide WMD proliferation, the revival of Russia, international terrorism, pirate
activities on Japanese SLOC, major disasters, climate change and its effects, the financial
crisis, the space-development race, and threats of international pandemics. The present
review of NDPG 04 comes in the wake of a fiscal crisis and scandals in the MOD/JSDF
that have opened the way for a broader discussion of Japan’s security and the US-Japan
security arrangement. Prior to the Koizumi administration (2001-06), Japan had many
political limitations such as an absence of legislation on responses to emergency
situations, a lack of effective mechanisms under the US-Japan security arrangement, and
the pacific atmosphere that pervaded the mainstream of Japanese politics. Because of
Koizumi’s and his three successors’ efforts, however, the Japanese political environment
on national security has changed dramatically, making it possible to discuss security
policy calmly.
Policymakers within the LDP and the New Komeito Party have recognized that it
is impossible for Japan to deal with these international and domestic security issues under
the present NDPG 04 and Japan’s existing security and defense system. Therefore they
have decided to revise NDPG 04, with the new NDPG 09 strengthening Japan’s security
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and defense system while at the same time assuring continued compliance with Article 9
of the Constitution.
They also have a consensus that in addition to strengthening the existing USJapan security arrangement, it is essential for Japan to bilaterally and multilaterally
cooperate with other countries in international organizations to prevent diverse threats
from reaching Japan. Based on this international cooperation, the Sun Tzu style crisisprevention strategy likely will be effective and relatively inexpensive for Japan as it faces
future challenges to its security. Japan’s answer to the security dilemma in NDPG 09
likely will be framed as a preventive strategy, not just for Japan’s own sake, but also for
security throughout the world.
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APPENDIX B
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APPENDIX C
Comparison of Attached Tables
of the NDPO/NDPG and the present Mid-Term Defense Program
Category

Major Units
Main
Equipment
Major Units
Main
Equipment

NDPG 04

Present
Mid-Term
DP

160,000
145,000
15,000

155,000
148,000
7,000

About 161,000
About 152,000
About 8,000

12 Div.

8 Div.
6 Brig.

8 Div.
6 Brig.

8 Div.
6 Brig.

Mobile Operation Units

1 Armored Div.
1 Art. Brig.
1 Airborne
Brig.
1 Comb.
Training Brig.
1 Helo Brig.

1 Armored Div.
1 Airborne
Brig.
1 Helo Brig.

1 Armored Div.
Cent. Readiness
Force

1 Armored Div.
Cent. Readiness
Force

Ground-to-Air Guided
Missile Units

8 Anti-Air Art.
Gr.

8 Anti-Air Art.
Gr.

8 Anti-Air Art.
Gr.

8 Anti-Air Art.
Gr.

About 900
About 900

About 600
About 600

About 790
About 830

4 Escort
Flotillas

4 Escort
Flotillas

4 Escort
Flotillas

7 Regional Unit

5 Regional Unit

6 Regional Unit

6 Div.
1 Minesweeper
Flotillas
13 Sq.

4 Div.
1 Minesweeper
Flotillas
9 Sq.

5 Div.
1 Minesweeper
Flotillas
9 Sq.

About 50
16
About 170

47
16
About 150

48
16
About 160

Regionally Deployed
Units in Peacetime

GSDF

NDPO 95

180,000

Authorized Personnel
Regular
Ready Reserve

MSDF

NDPO 76

Tanks
Main Artillery

Destroyer Units
(For Mobile Op.)
Destroyer Units
(Regional District Units)
Submarine Units
Minesweeping Units
Patrol Aircraft Units

Destroyers
Submarines
Combat Aircraft

2 Comb. Brig.

---

4 Escort
Flotillas
10 Regional
Unit
6 Div.
2 Minesweeper
Flotillas
16 Sq.

About 60
16
About 220
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NDPO 76

NDPO 95

NDPG 04

Present
Mid-Term
DP

28 Warning Gr.
-1Sq.
-10 Sq.
3 Sq.
1 Sq.
3 Sq.
-6 Gr.

8 Warning Gr.
20 Warning Sr.
1Sq.
-9 Sq.
3 Sq.
1 Sq.
3 Sq.
-6 Gr.

8 Warning Gr.
20 Warning Sr.
1Airborne Sq.
(2 Sq.)
12 Sq.
--1 Sq.
3 Sq.
1 Sq.
6 Gr.

8 Warning Gr.
20 Warning Sr.
1Airborne Sq.
(2 Sq.)
12 Sq.
--1 Sq.
3 Sq.
1 Sq.
6 Gr.

About 430
(About 350)

About 400
(About 300)

About 350
(About 260)

About 350
(About 260)

Aegis-equipped Destroyers

--

--

4

4

Aircraft Control &
Warning Units
Surface-to-Air Guided
Missile Units

----

----

7 Gr.
4 Sq.
3 Gr.

7 Gr.
4 Sq.
3 Gr.

Category

Main Equipment & Major
Units which can also be
used in MD

Main
Equipment

ASDF

Major Units

Aircraft Control &
Warning Units
Fighter Units
Fighter-Interceptor Units
Support Fighter Units
Air Reconnaissance Units
Air Transport Units
Air Refuel/Trans. Units
Surface-to-Air Guided
Missile Units

Combat Aircraft
(Fighter Aircraft)

Abbreviations
Div: Division, Comb.: Combined, Brig.: Brigade, Art.: Artillery, Helo: Helicopter, Cent.:Central, Gr.:
Group, Op.: Operation, Sq.: Squadron, Trans.: Transport
Source: Data from Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2008. Shibuya, Tokyo: Urban connections,
2008. 134

177

APPENDIX D
Japanese Governmental Long-term Debt Outstanding and GDP

Source: Data from Ministry of Finance "Transition of Long-term Debt Outstanding Since FY 1970." Fiscal
Data Materials in April 2009. April 2009. http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/syukei/siryou/sy2104h.pdf
(accessed April 27, 2009).

Japanese Governmental General Expenditures and Defense Budget on General Account

Note: Annual Expenditures on General Account consist of Local Allocation Tax Grants, National Debt
Service, and General Annual Expenditures including National Defense Budget.
Source: Data from Ministry of Finance. "Transition of Annual Expenditures on General Account." Fiscal
Data Materials in April 2009. April 2009. http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/syukei/siryou/sy2104d.pdf
(accessed April 27, 2009).
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Japanese Governmental Annual Expenditures and Breakdowns

Note: General Annual Expenditures (See the previous page) consist of all expenditures except Local
Allocation Tax Grants and National Debt Service.
Source: Data from Ministry of Finance. "Transition of Annual Expenditures on General Account." Fiscal
Data Materials in April 2009. April 2009. http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/syukei/siryou/sy2104d.pdf
(accessed April 27, 2009).
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Composition of National Defense Budget (FY 2008)
Total: 4.7796 trillion yen
Personnel and Food Provisions: 2.094 trillion yen
Obligatory Outlay Expenses & General Material Expenses: 2.6856 trillion yen

Source: Data from Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2008. Shibuya, Tokyo: Urban connections,
2008. 423
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APPENDIX E
Time Line of Japan’s Security and Defense Policy After WWII

1945
1946
1947
1950
1951
1952

Aug. 14
Sep. 2
Oct. 11
Nov. 3
May 3
Jun. 25
Jul. 7
Jul. 8
Aug. 10
Sep. 8
Apr. 26
Apr. 28
Jul. 31
Aug. 1
Mar. 8

1954
1956
1957
1959
1960
1961
1966

Jun. 9
Jul. 1
Jul. 2
Oct. 19
May 20
Jun. 14
Dec. 16
Jan. 19
Jul. 18
Nov. 29
Apr. 21

1967
Dec. 7
Feb. 7
1972

Oct. 9

1978
1979
1982

Jun. 8
Oct. 29
Nov. 27
Jul. 17
Jun. 8

1982

Jul. 23

1983

Dec. 2

1976

Domestic
Japan’s decision of cease-fire
Signing of the Instrument of Surrender
MacArthur-Shidehara meeting
Promulgation of the Japanese Constitution
Enforcement of the Japanese Constitution

International

Korean War (-Jul. 27, 1953)
UNSCR 84
MacArthur’s authorization of establishment of
the NPR/CSF
Establishment of the NPR
Signing of Treaty of Peace with Japan and the US-Japan Security Treaty
Establishment of the CSF
Enforcement of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the US-Japan Security
Treaty
Promulgation of the NSA Act
Establishment of the NSA
Signing of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
Promulgation of the SDF Act and the JDA
Establishment Law
Establishment of the SDF
Establishment of the National Defense Council
Agreement of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration
Approval of the Basic Guidelines for National
Defense
Approval of the Defense Build-up Plan
Supreme Court’s decision on the Sunagawa case
Signing of the new US-Japan Security Treaty
Approval of the 2nd Defense Build-up Plan
Approval of the 3rd Defense Build-up Plan
Announcement of the Three Principles on Arms
Export
Announcement of the Three Non-nuclear
Principles
Approval of the 4th Defense Build-up Plan
Approval of the key matters for inclusion in the
4th Defense Build-up Plan
Enforcement of the NPT
Approval of the NDPO 76
Signing of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation
Announcement of the mid-term defense estimate
Enforcement of the BWC
Announcement of the 2nd mid-term defense
estimate
Enforcement of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
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1985
1986

1990

Sep.18
Jul. 1
Dec. 30

Domestic
Approval of the Mid-Term Defense Program
Establishment of the Security Council
Announcement of the rule of the defense budget
being within GNP 1%

Aug. 2
Nov. 29
Dec. 20

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
UNSCR 678
Approval of the Mid-Term Defense Program FY
1991 - FY 1995

Jan. 17
Apr. 11
1991

Apr. 16

Operation Desert Storm
UNSCR 687
Dispatch of 6 MSDF minesweepers to the Persian
Gulf

Dec. 25
Jan. 29
1992

1995

Mar. 20
Aug. 15
Nov. 28
Dec. 14
Apr. 17
Sep. 18

1996
Dec. 24
1997

Apr. 29
Sep. 23
Jun. 22

1998

1999

Aug. 31
Dec. 14
Mar. 1
Mar. 23
Aug. 25
Sep. 30
Jul. 8

2000
2001

Collapse of the USSR
Enforcement of the partial amendment of the
Law Concerning the Dispatch of International
Disaster Relief Teams
China’s enforcement of the
Law on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone

Feb. 25
Aug. 10

Dec. 15
Jun. 15
Sep. 11

International

Enforcement of the International Peace
Cooperation Law
Tokyo subway sarin attack
Murayama’s statement
Approval of NDPO 95
Approval of the Mid-Term Defense Program FY
1996 - FY2000
Agreement of the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration
DPRK midget submarine
enters S. Korean waters
Establishment of the Law Regarding Response to
Foreign Submarines Navigating Underwater in
Territorial and Inland Waters
Enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Signing of the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation
DPRK midget submarine
enters S. Korean waters
DPRK launch of Taepodong-1
Dispatch of the JSDF medical team to Honduras
Enforcement of the Mine Ban Treaty
Discovery of DPRK spy ships
Enforcement of the Law Concerning Measures to
Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
JCO nuclear accident
Eruption of Miyakejima
Approval of the Mid-Term Defense Program FY
2001 - FY2005
Establishment of the SCO
Terrorist attacks in NY and
DC
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Domestic
Oct. 7
2001

Nov. 2
Nov. 9

2002

Dec. 22
Jan. 21
Sep. 17
Mar. 20
May 22
Jun. 6

2003
Aug. 1
Dec. 19
Jan. 16
Jun. 14
2004

Nov. 10
Dec. 10
Dec. 26
Feb. 19

2005

2006

Mar. 14
Aug. 18
Feb. 14
May 1
Jul. 15
Sep. 4
Oct. 14
Nov. 29
Jan. 9
Mar. 1
May 12
May 14

2007

Jul. 20
Aug. 17

2008

Nov. 27
Nov. 28
Feb. 9
Feb. 19
Apr. 21
May 28

International
US and UK attack
Afghanistan

Enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law
Dispatch of the MSDF fleet-replenishment unit to
the Indian Ocean
Discovery of DPRK spy ships
Hosting the Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan
Agreement of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
Operation Iraq Freedom
UNSCR 1483
Enactment of three armed attack situation
response laws
Enforcement of the Law Concerning Special
Measures on Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq
Approval of the preparation of a basic missile
defense system
Dispatch of GSDF troops to Iraq
Enactment of seven laws on legislation
concerning contingency response measures
PLAN Submarine enters Japanese waters
Approval of NDPG 04
Earthquake and tsunami
near Sumatra
Announcement of US-Japan common strategic objectives
China’s enactment of the
Anti-Secession Law
SCO’s Peace Mission 2005
Hosting BWC Tokyo Seminar
Agreement of the US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
UNSCR 1695
Enactment of the ReCAAP
UNSCR 1718
Establishment of the ReCAAP ISC
Establishment of the MOD
Agreement of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration
Earthquake in Sichuan
Enactment of the Act on Procedures for
Amendment of the Constitution
Enactment of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy
Russia’s announcement of
resuming strategic patrol
flights
Arrest of Vice-Minister of Defense Moriya
PLAN destroyer visits Tokyo
Russian TU-95 enters Japanese air space
Collision between the destroyer Atago and the fishing boat the Seitokumaru
Somali pirate’s attack on the Japanese tanker Takayama
Hosting TICAD IV
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2008

May 28
Jun. 2
Jun. 24
Jul. 15
Oct. 22
Nov. 26
Dec. 3
Feb. 17
Mar. 14

2009

Mar. 27
Apr. 5
Apr. 17

Domestic
Enactment of the Basic Space Law

International
UNSCR 1816

MSDF destroyer visits Zhanjing
Announcement of the MOD reform
Agreement of the Japan-India Joint Declaration
Terrorist attack in Mumbai
Signing of the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Agreement of US-Japan on the relocation of III MEF
Dispatch of 2 MSDF destroyers to the Gulf of
Aden
US new strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan
DPRK launch of Taepodong-2
Hosting the Pakistan Donors Conference

Source: Data from Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2008. Shibuya, Tokyo: Urban connections,
2008. 541-575
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